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Abstract:
The standard solution concept for stochastic games is Markov perfect equilib-
rium (MPE); however, its computation becomes intractable as the number of
players increases. Instead, we consider mean field equilibrium (MFE) that has
been popularized in the recent literature. MFE takes advantage of averaging
effects in models with a large number of players. We make three main contribu-
tions. First, our main result provides conditions that ensure the uniqueness of
an MFE. We believe this uniqueness result is the first of its nature in the class
of models we study. Second, we generalize previous MFE existence results.
Third, we provide general comparative statics results. We apply our results to
dynamic oligopoly models and to heterogeneous agent macroeconomic models
commonly used in previous work in economics and operations.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider a general class of stochastic games in which every player has an
individual state that impacts payoffs. Historically, Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) has
been a standard solution concept for this type of stochastic games (Maskin and Tirole,
2001). However, in realistically-sized applications, MPE suffers from two drawbacks.
First, because in MPE players keep track of the state of every competitor, the state space
grows very quickly as the number of players grows, making the analysis and computation
of MPE infeasible in many applications of practical interest. Second, as the number of
players increases, it becomes difficult to believe that players can in fact track the exact
state of the other players and optimize their strategies accordingly.
As an alternative, mean field equilibrium (MFE) has received extensive attention
recently. In an MFE, each player optimizes her expected discounted payoff, assuming
that the distribution of the other players’ states is fixed. Given the players’ strategy, the
distribution of the players’ states is an invariant distribution of the stochastic process
that governs the states’ dynamics. As a solution concept for stochastic games, MFE
offers several advantages over MPE. First, because players only condition their strategies
on their own state (the competitors’ state is assumed to be fixed), MFE is computationally
tractable. Second, as several of the papers we cite below prove, due to averaging effects
MFE provides accurate approximations of optimal behavior as the number of players
grows. As a result, it provides an appealing behavioral model in games with many players.
MFE models have many applications in economics, operations research, and optimal
control; e.g., studies of anonymous sequential games (Jovanovic and Rosenthal, 1988),
continuous-time mean field models (Huang et al. (2006) and Lasry and Lions (2007)), dy-
namic user equilibrium (Friesz et al., 1993), auction theory (Iyer et al. (2014), Balseiro et al.
(2015), and Bimpikis et al. (2018)), dynamic oligopoly models (Weintraub et al. (2008)
and Adlakha et al. (2015)), heterogeneous agent macro models (Hopenhayn (1992) and
Heathcote et al. (2009)), matching markets (Kanoria and Saban (2019) and Arnosti et al.
(2018)), spatial competition (Yang et al., 2018), and evolutionary game theory (Tembine et al.,
2009).
We provide three main contributions regarding MFE. First, we provide conditions
that ensure the uniqueness of an MFE. This novel result is important because it implies
sharp counterfactual predictions. Second, we generalize previous existence results to a
general state space setting. Our existence result includes the case of a countable state
space and a countable number of players, as well as the case of a continuous state space
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and a continuum of players. In addition, we provide novel comparative statics results for
stochastic games that do not exhibit strategic complementarities.
We apply our results to well-known dynamic oligopoly models in which individual
states represent the firms’ ability to compete in the market (Doraszelski and Pakes, 2007).
MFE and the related concept of oblivious equilibrium have previously been used to analyze
such models.1 In the models we study, for each firm, being in a larger states is more
profitable, while if competitors’ states are larger it is less profitable. In MFE, each firm’s
action is increasing in its own state but decreasing in the other firms’ states. This structure
is quite natural in dynamic models of competition that have been studied in the operations
research and economics literature, and we leverage it to prove our uniqueness result. We
provide examples of dynamic investments models of quality, capacity, and advertising, as
well as a dynamic reputation model of an online market. We also apply our results to
commonly used heterogeneous agent macroeconomic models.
We now explain our contributions in more detail and compare them to previous work
on MFE.
Uniqueness. We do not know of any general uniqueness result regarding MFE in
discrete-time mean field equilibrium models.2 Only a few papers have obtained uniqueness
results in specific applications. Hopenhayn (1992) proves the uniqueness of an MFE in a
specific dynamic competition model. Light (2018) proves the uniqueness of an MFE in a
Bewley-Aiyagari model under specific conditions on the model’s primitives (see a related
result in Hu and Shmaya (2019)). Our main theorem in this paper is a novel result that
provides conditions ensuring the uniqueness of an MFE for broader classes of models.
Informally, under mild additional technical conditions, we show that if the probability
that a player reaches a higher state in the next period is decreasing in the other players’
states, and is increasing in the player’s own state in the current period, then the MFE
is unique (see Theorem 1). Hence, the conditions reduce the difficulty of showing that a
stochastic game has a unique MFE to proving properties of the players’ optimal strategies.
In many applications, one can show that these properties of the optimal strategies arise
naturally. For example, in several dynamic models of competition in operations research
and economics, a higher firm’s state (e.g., the quality of the firm’s product or the firm’s
1For example, Adlakha et al. (2015) use MFE, which they call stationary equilibrium. Adlakha et al.
(2015) were motivated by Hopenhayn (1992) who introduced the term to study models with infinite
numbers of firms. Weintraub et al. (2008) introduce oblivious equilibrium to study settings with finite
numbers of firms.
2Lasry and Lions (2007) prove the uniqueness of an MFE in a continuous time setting under a cer-
tain monotonicity condition (see also Carmona and Delarue (2018)). This monotonicity condition is
different and does not hold in the applications studied in the present paper.
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capacity) implies higher profitability, and the firm can make investments in each period in
order to improve its state. In this setting, one can show that a firm invests less when its
competitors’ states are higher; hence, competitors’ higher states induce a lower state for
the firm in the next period. In contrast, if the firm’s own current state is higher, it induces
a higher state in the next period. Another example is heterogeneous agent macro models
where each agent solves a consumption-savings problem. The agents’ states correspond
to their current savings level and current labor productivity. Under certain conditions it
can be shown that an agent saves less when the other agents save more. On the other
hand, the agents’ next period’s savings are increasing in their current savings.
We apply our uniqueness result to a general class of dynamic oligopoly models and
heterogeneous agent macroeconomic models for which MFE has been used to perform
counterfactual predictions implied by a policy or system change. In the past, in the
absence of this result, previous work mostly focused on a particular MFE selected by a
given algorithm, or on one with a specific structure. In the absence of uniqueness, the
predictions often depend on the choice of the MFE, and therefore, uniqueness significantly
sharpens such counterfactual analysis. We also show that the uniqueness results proved
in Hopenhayn (1992) and Light (2018) can be obtained using our approach.
Existence. Prior literature has considered the existence of equilibria in stochas-
tic games. Some prior work considered the existence of Markov perfect equilibria (MPE)
(see Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010) and He and Sun (2017)). Adlakha et al. (2015)
prove the existence of an MFE for the case of a countable and unbounded state space.
Acemoglu and Jensen (2015) consider a closely related notion of equilibrium that is called
stationary equilibrium and prove its existence for the case of a compact state space and
a specific transition dynamic that is commonly used in economics (see Stokey and Lucas
(1989)). Stationary equilibrium in the sense of Acemoglu and Jensen (2015) is an MFE
where the players’ payoff functions depend on the other players’ states through an ag-
gregator. Our existence result applies for a general compact state space, more general
dependence on the payoff function, and more general transitions. In this sense, it is more
closely related to the result of Adlakha and Johari (2013). Adlakha and Johari (2013)
prove the existence of an MFE for the case of a compact state space in stochastic games
with strategic complementarities using a lattice-theoretical approach. Instead, we do not
assume strategic complementarities and our state space can be any compact separable
metric space. For our existence result, we assume the standard continuity conditions on
model primitives that are assumed in the papers mentioned above. In addition, we assume
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that the optimal stationary strategy of the players is single-valued.3 Concavity conditions
on the profit function and the transition function can be imposed in order to ensure that
the optimal stationary strategy is indeed single-valued. The main technical difficulty in
proving existence is to prove the weak continuity of the nonlinear MFE operator (see
Theorem 3).
Comparative statics. While some papers contain certain specific results on how
equilibria change with the parameters of the model (for example, see Hopenhayn (1992)
and Aiyagari (1994)), only a few papers have obtained general comparative results in large
dynamic economies (see Acemoglu and Jensen (2015) for a discussion of the difficulties
associated with deriving such results). Three notable exceptions are Adlakha and Johari
(2013), Acemoglu and Jensen (2015), and Acemoglu and Jensen (2018). Adlakha and Johari
(2013) use the techniques for comparing equilibria developed in Milgrom and Roberts
(1994) to derive general comparative statics results, and essentially rely on results about
the monotonicity of fixed points. The direct application of these results requires that the
MFE operator (see Equation (1)) be increasing. Our comparative statics results are dif-
ferent because they rely on the uniqueness of an MFE. In particular, the MFE operator is
not increasing in our setting (see more details in Section 3). In this sense, our comparative
static results are more similar to the results in Acemoglu and Jensen (2015); however, our
model has more general dynamics that include, for example, investment decisions with
random outcomes that are typically considered in dynamic oligopoly models (see Section
4). Our results are useful because they establish the directional changes of MFE when
important model parameters, such as the discount factor and the investment cost, change.
2 The Model
In this section we define our general model of a stochastic game and define mean field equi-
librium (MFE). The model and the definition of an MFE are similar to Adlakha and Johari
(2013) and Adlakha et al. (2015).
3In the dynamic oligopoly models and the heterogeneous agent macro models that we study in Sec-
tions 4 and 5, previous literature assumes that the players use pure strategies. Motivated by this fact,
we focus on pure strategy MFE. In this case, if the optimal stationary strategy of the players is not
single-valued then the MFE operator may not be convex-valued. Similar problems arise in proving the
existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
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2.1 Stochastic Game Model
In this section we describe our stochastic game model. Differently to standard stochastic
games in the literature (see Shapley (1953)), in our model, every player has an individ-
ual state. Players are coupled through their payoffs and state transition dynamics. A
stochastic game has the following elements:
Time. The game is played in discrete time. We index time periods by t = 1, 2, . . . .
Players. There are m players in the game. We use i to denote a particular player.
States. The state of player i at time t is denoted by xi,t ∈ X where X is a separable
metric space. Typically, we assume that the state space X is in Rn or that X is countable.
We denote the state of all players at time t by xt and the state of all players except player
i at time t by x−i,t.
Actions. The action taken by player i at time t is denoted by ai,t ∈ A where A ⊆ Rq.
We use at to denote the action of all players at time t. The set of feasible actions for a
player in state x is given by Γ(x) ⊆ A.
States’ dynamics. The state of a player evolves in a Markov fashion. Formally, let
ht = {x0,a0, . . . ,xt−1,at−1} denote the history up to time t. Conditional on ht, players’
states at time t are independent of each other. This assumption implies that random
shocks are idiosyncratic, ruling out aggregate random shocks that are common to all
players. Player i’s state xi,t at time t depends on the past history ht only through the
state of player i at time t− 1, xi,t−1; the states of other players at time t− 1, x−i,t−1; and
the action taken by player i at time t− 1, ai,t−1.
If player i’s state at time t− 1 is xi,t−1, the player takes an action ai,t−1 at time t− 1,
the states of the other players at time t − 1 are x−i,t−1, and ζi,t is player i’s realized
idiosyncratic random shock at time t, then player i’s next period’s state is given by
xi,t = w(xi,t−1, ai,t−1,x−i,t−1, ζi,t).
We assume that ζ is a random variable that takes values ζj ∈ E with probability pj for
j = 1, . . . , n. w : X × A×Xm−1 × E → X is the transition function.
Payoff. In a given time period, if the state of player i is xi, the state of the other
players is x−i, and the action taken by player i is ai, then the single-period payoff to
player i is π(xi, ai,x−i) ∈ R. In Section 2.2 we extend our model to a model in which
players are also coupled through actions, that is, the functions w and π can also depend
on the rivals’ current actions.
Discount factor. The players discount their future payoff by a discount factor 0 < β <
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1. Thus, a player i’s infinite horizon payoff is given by:
∑∞
t=1 β
t−1π(xi,t, ai,t,x−i,t).
In many games, coupling between players is independent of the identity of the players.
This notion of anonymity captures scenarios where the interaction between players is via
aggregate information about the state (see Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988)). Let s
(m)
−i,t(y)
denote the fraction of players excluding player i that have their state as y at time t. That
is,
s
(m)
−i,t(y) =
1
m− 1
∑
j 6=i
1{xj,t=y}
where 1D is the indicator function of the set D. We refer to s
(m)
−i,t as the population state
at time t (from player i’s point of view).
Definition 1 (Anonymous stochastic game). A stochastic game is called an anony-
mous stochastic game if the payoff function π(xi,t, ai,t,x−i,t) and the transition function
w(xi,t, ai,t,x−i,t, ζi,t+1) depend on x−i,t only through s
(m)
−i,t. In an abuse of notation, we
write π(xi,t, ai,t, s
(m)
−i,t) for the payoff to player i, and w(xi,t, ai,t, s
(m)
−i,t, ζi,t+1) for the transi-
tion function for player i.
For the remainder of the paper, we focus our attention on anonymous stochastic games.
For ease of notation, we often drop the subscripts i and t and denote a generic transition
function by w(x, a, s, ζ) and a generic payoff function by π(x, a, s) where s represents the
population state of players other than the player under consideration. Anonymity requires
that a player’s single-period payoff and transition function depend on the states of other
players via their empirical distribution over the state space, and not on their specific
identify. In anonymous stochastic games the functional form of the payoff function and
transition function are the same, regardless of the number of players m.4 In that sense,
we often interpret the profit function π(x, a, s) as representing a limiting regime in which
the number of players is infinite (see Section 4 for more details).
We let P(X) be the set of all possible population states on X , that is P(X) is the set
of all probability measures on X . We endow P(X) with the weak topology. Since P(X)
is metrizable, the weak topology on P(X) is determined by weak convergence (for details
see Aliprantis and Border (2006)). We say that sn ∈ P(X) converges weakly to s ∈ P(X)
if for all bounded and continuous functions f : X → R we have
lim
n→∞
∫
X
f(x)sn(dx) =
∫
X
f(x)s(dx).
4Our results also generalize for models in which the primitives depend on the number of players m
like in the study of oblivious equilibria (Weintraub et al., 2008)).
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For the rest of the paper, we assume the following conditions on the primitives of the
model:
Assumption 1 (i) π is bounded and (jointly) continuous. w is continuous.5
(ii) X is compact.
(iii) The correspondence Γ : X → 2A is compact-valued and continuous.6
2.2 Extensions To The Basic Model
We note two extensions that can be important in applications for which we can extend
our results.
First, in our basic mean field model, we assume that the players are coupled through
their states: both the transition function and the payoff function of each player depend on
the states of all other players. We note that even in this setting, a player’s payoff function
can depend on rivals’ actions as long as these actions do not affect the evolution of their
own state nor the evolution of the population state. For instance, the players’ payoff
functions can depend on the static pricing or quantity decisions of the other players, as
we further explain in Section 4.1.
In certain models of interest such as learning-by-doing and dynamic advertising, how-
ever, players’ are coupled through the dynamic actions, ai,t. That is, the actions of other
players, a−i,t, affect a player’s transition function and payoff function. For these cases,
we consider a model where the transition function and the payoff function of each player
depend on both the states and the actions of all other players. The model is like our
original model except that now the probability measure s describes the joint distribution
of players over actions and states and not only over states, that is, s ∈ P(X ×A). Thus,
the transition function w(x, a, s, ζ) and the payoff function π(x, a, s) depend on the joint
distribution over state-action pairs s ∈ P(X × A).
All the results in the paper can be extended to this setting where the population
state is a measure on P(X ×A) (see Section A.1 in the Appendix for more details). The
monotonicity conditions that are needed in order to prove the uniqueness of an MFE in
the case that the population is a measure on P(X ×A) are similar to the conditions that
are needed in the case that the population is a measure on P(X). In Section 4.2 we prove
the uniqueness of an MFE for a dynamic advertising model where the players’ payoff
5 Recall that we endow P(X) with the weak topology.
6 By continuous we mean both upper hemicontinuous and lower hemicontinuous.
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functions depend on the other players’ actions (advertising expenditures), and thus, the
population state is a measure on P(X ×A).
Our second extension relaxes the assumption on our base model that players are ex-
ante homogeneous. To consider players that may be ex-ante heterogeneous with different
model primitives, we extend our model to a setting in which each player has a fixed type
through out the time horizon that is drawn from a finite set. Then, the payoff function
and transition function can depend on this type. We show that all our results hold in this
more general setting (see Section A.2 for more details). In particular, we show that if the
conditions that we use in order to prove our results hold for every type, then the results
are valid for the model with ex-ante heterogeneous players.
2.3 Mean Field Equilibrium
In Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), players’ strategies are functions of the population
state. However, MPE quickly becomes intractable as the number of players grows, because
the number of possible population states becomes too large. Instead, in a game with a
large number of players, we might expect that idiosyncratic fluctuations of players’ states
“average out”, and hence the actual population state remains roughly constant over time.
Because the effect of other players on a single player’s payoff and transition function is
only via the population state, it is intuitive that, as the number of players increases, a
single player’s effect on the outcome of the game is negligible. Based on this intuition,
related schemes for approximating Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) have been proposed
in different application domains via a solution concept we call mean field equilibrium
(MFE).
Informally, an MFE is a strategy for the players and a population state such that:
(1) Each player optimizes her expected discounted payoff assuming that this population
state is fixed; and (2) Given the players’ strategy, the fixed population state is an in-
variant distribution of the states’ dynamics. The interpretation is that a single player
conjectures the population state to be s. Therefore, in determining her future expected
payoff stream, a player considers a payoff function and a transition function evaluated
at the fixed population state s. In MFE, the conjectured s is the correct one given the
strategies being played. MFE alleviates the complexity of MPE, because in the former
the population state is fixed, while in the latter players keep track of the exact evolution
of the population state. We refer the reader to the papers cited in Section 1 for a more
detailed motivation and rigorous justifications for using MFE.
9
Let X t := X × . . .×X︸ ︷︷ ︸
t times
. For a fixed population state, a nonrandomized pure strategy
σ is a sequence of (Borel) measurable functions (σ1, σ2, . . . , ) such that σt : X
t → A and
σt(x1, . . . , xt) ∈ Γ(xt) for all t ∈ N. That is, a strategy σ assigns a feasible action to
every finite string of states. Note that a single player’s strategy depends only on her own
history of states and does not depend on the population state. This strategy is called an
oblivious strategy (see Weintraub et al. (2008) and Adlakha et al. (2015)).
For each initial state x ∈ X and long run average population state s ∈ P(X), a
strategy σ induces a probability measure over the space XN, describing the evolution of
a player’s state.7 We denote the expectation with respect to that probability measure by
Eσ, and the associated states-actions stochastic process by {x(t), a(t)}∞t=1.
When a player uses a strategy σ, the population state is fixed at s ∈ P(X), and the
initial state is x ∈ X , then the player’s expected present discounted value is
Vσ(x, s) = Eσ
(
∞∑
t=1
βt−1π(x(t), a(t), s)
)
.
Denote
V (x, s) = sup
σ
Vσ(x, s).
That is, V (x, s) is the maximal expected payoff that the player can achieve when the
initial state is x and the population state is fixed at s ∈ P(X). We call V the value
function and a strategy σ attaining it optimal.
Standard dynamic programming arguments (see Bertsekas and Shreve (1978)) show
that the value function satisfies the Bellman equation:
V (x, s) = max
a∈Γ(x)
π(x, a, s) + β
n∑
j=1
pjV (w(x, a, s, ζj), s).
Note that the population state s is fixed. In addition, under Assumption 1, there exists
an optimal stationary Markov strategy (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix). Let G(x, s) be
the optimal stationary strategy correspondence, i.e.,
G(x, s) = argmax
a∈Γ(x)
π(x, a, s) + β
n∑
j=1
pjV (w(x, a, s, ζj), s).
7The probability measure on XN is uniquely defined (see for example Bertsekas and Shreve (1978)).
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Let B(X) be the Borel σ-algebra on X . For a strategy g ∈ G and a fixed population state
s ∈ P(X), the probability that player i’s next period’s state will lie in a set B ∈ B(X),
given that her current state is x ∈ X and she takes the action a = g(x, s), is:
Qg(x, s, B) = Pr(w(x, g(x, s), s, ζ) ∈ B).
Now suppose that the population state is s, and all players use a stationary strategy
g ∈ G. Because of averaging effects, we expect that if the number of players is large, then
the long run population state should in fact be an invariant distribution of the Markov
kernel Qg on X that describes the dynamics of an individual player.
We can now define an MFE. In an MFE, every player conjectures that s is the fixed
long run population state and plays according to a stationary strategy g. On the other
hand, if every agent plays according to g when the population state is s, then the long
run population state of all players, s, should constitute an invariant distribution of Qg.
Definition 2 A stationary strategy g and a population state s ∈ P(X) constitute an MFE
if the following two conditions hold:
1. Optimality: g is optimal given s, i.e., g(x, s) ∈ G(x, s).
2. Consistency: s is an invariant distribution of Qg. That is,
s(B) =
∫
X
Qg(x, s, B)s(dx).
for all B ∈ B(X), where we take Lebesgue integral with respect to the measure s.
Under Assumption 1 it can be shown that G(x, s) is nonempty, compact-valued and
upper hemicontinuous. The proof is a standard application of the maximum theorem. We
provide the proof for completeness (see Lemma 2). In Theorem 3 we prove the existence
of a population state that satisfies the consistency requirement in Definition 2.
3 Main Results
In this section we present our main results. In Section 3.1 we provide conditions that
ensure the uniqueness of an MFE. In Section 3.2 we prove the existence of an MFE. In
Section 3.3 we provide conditions that ensure unambiguous comparative statics results
regarding MFE.
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3.1 The Uniqueness of an MFE
In this section we present our uniqueness result.
We recall that a stationary strategy-population state pair (g, s) is an MFE if and only
if g is optimal and s is a fixed point of the operator Φ : P(X)→ P(X) defined by
Φs(B) =
∫
X
Qg(x, s, B)s(dx), (1)
for all B ∈ B(X).
We prove uniqueness by showing that the operator Φ has a unique fixed point. In order
to prove uniqueness we will assume that G is single-valued. For the rest of the section we
will assume that g ∈ G is the unique selection from the optimal strategy correspondence
G. In the next section we provide conditions that ensure that G is indeed single-valued
(see Lemma 1). G being single-valued and Theorem 3 (see Section 3.2) imply that Φ has
at least one fixed point. In Theorem 1 we will show that under certain conditions the
operator Φ has at most one fixed point.
We omit the reference to g inQg(x, s, B), i.e., we writeQ(x, s, B) instead ofQg(x, s, B).
Since the Markov kernel Q depends on s, it is complicated to work directly with the
operator Φ. Thus, to prove the uniqueness of an MFE and to prove our comparative
statics results, we introduce an auxiliary operator that is easier to work with. For each
s ∈ P(X), define the operator Ms : P(X)→ P(X) by
Msθ(B) =
∫
X
Q(x, s, B)θ(dx).
We introduce the following useful definition.
Definition 3 We say that Q is X-ergodic if the following two conditions hold:
(i) For any s ∈ P(X), the operator Ms has a unique fixed point µs.
(ii) Mns θ converges weakly to µs for any probability measure θ ∈ P(X).
Note that s is an MFE if and only if µs = s is a fixed point of the operator Ms. X-
ergodicity means that for every population state s ∈ P(X) the players’ long-run state is
independent of the initial state. The X-ergodicity of Q can be established using standard
results from the theory of Markov chains in general state spaces (see Meyn and Tweedie
(2012)). When Q is increasing in x, which we assume in order to prove the uniqueness of
an MFE (see Assumption 2), then the X-ergodicity of Q can be established using results
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from the theory of monotone Markov chains. These results usually require a splitting
condition (see Bhattacharya and Lee (1988) and Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992)) that
typically holds in applications of interest. Specifically, in Sections 4 and 5 we show that
X-ergodicity holds in important classes of dynamic models.
We now introduce other notation and definitions that are helpful in proving uniqueness.
We assume that X is endowed with a closed partial order ≥. In the important case
X = Rn, x, y ∈ X we write x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi for each i = 1, .., n. Let S ⊆ X . We say that
a function f : S → R is increasing if f(y) ≥ f(x) whenever y ≥ x and we say that f is
strictly increasing if f(y) > f(x) whenever y > x.
For s1, s2 ∈ P(X) we say that s1 stochastically dominates s2 and we write s1 SD s2
if for every increasing function f : X → R we have∫
X
f(x)s1(dx) ≥
∫
X
f(x)s2(dx),
when the integrals exist. We say that B ∈ B(X) is an upper set if x1 ∈ B and x2 ≥ x1
imply x2 ∈ B. Recall from Kamae et al. (1977) that s1 SD s2 if and only if for every
upper set B we have s1(B) ≥ s2(B).
In addition, for the rest of the section we will assume that there exists a binary relation
 on P(X), such that s2 ∼ s1 (i.e., s2  s1 and s1  s2)) implies π(x, a, s1) = π(x, a, s2)
for all (x, a) ∈ X × A and w(x, a, s1, ζ) = w(x, a, s2, ζ) for all (x, a, ζ) ∈ X × A× E.
Note that such binary relation always exists, for example one can take s2 ∼ s1 ⇔ s2 =
s1. For our uniqueness result we will further require that the binary relation  on P(X)
is complete, that is, for all s1, s2 ∈ P(X) we either have s1  s2 or s2  s1. In many
applications (see Section 4 and Section 5) there exists a function H : P(X)→ R such that
π˜(x, a,H(s)) = π(x, a, s) and w˜(x, a,H(s), ζ) = w(x, a, s, ζ), where H is continuous and
increasing with respect to the stochastic dominance order SD. In this case, a natural
complete order  on P(X) arises by defining s1  s2 if and only if H(s1) ≥ H(s2). Below,
we also discuss the case of a non-complete order. We say that  agrees with SD if for
any s1, s2 ∈ P(X), s1 SD s2 implies s1  s2.
We say thatQ is increasing in x if for each s ∈ P(X), we have Q(x2, s, ·) SD Q(x1, s, ·)
whenever x2 ≥ x1. In addition, we say that Q is decreasing in s if for each x ∈ X , we
have Q(x, s1, ·) SD Q(x, s2, ·) whenever s2  s1. We now state the main theorem of the
paper. We show that if Q is X-ergodic, Q is increasing in x and decreasing in s, and 
is complete and agrees with SD, then if an MFE exists, it is unique.
Intuitively, Q decreasing in s implies that the probability that a player will move to
13
a higher state in the next period is decreasing in the current period’s population state.
If there are two MFEs, s2 and s1, such that s2  s1 (i.e., s2 is “higher” than s1), then
the probability of moving to a higher state under s2 is lower than under s1, which is not
consistent with s2  s1, with the definition of an MFE, and the fact that  agrees with
SD.
8
Assumption 2 (i) Q is X-ergodic. Q is increasing in x and decreasing in s.
(ii)  agrees with SD.
(iii) G is single-valued.
Theorem 1 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. If the binary relation  is complete, then
if an MFE exists, it is unique.
Proof. Let θ1, θ2 ∈ P(X) and assume that θ1 SD θ2. Let B be an upper set and let
s1, s2 be two MFEs such that s2  s1. We have
Ms2θ2(B) =
∫
X
Q(x, s2, B)θ2(dx)
≤
∫
X
Q(x, s1, B)θ2(dx)
≤
∫
X
Q(x, s1, B)θ1(dx)
=Ms1θ1(B).
Thus, for any upper set B we have Ms2θ2(B) ≤Ms1θ1(B) which implies that Ms1θ1 SD
Ms2θ2. The first inequality follows from the fact that Q(x, s, B) is decreasing in s for an
upper set B and all x. The second inequality follows from the fact that θ1 SD θ2 and
Q(x, s, B) is increasing in x for an upper set B and any s.
We conclude that Mns1θ1 SD M
n
s2
θ2 for all n ∈ N. Q being X-ergodic implies that
Mnsiθi converges weakly
9 to µsi = si. Since SD is closed under weak convergence (see
Kamae et al. (1977)), we have s1 SD s2.
We conclude that if s1 and s2 are two MFEs such that s2  s1, then s1 SD s2. Since
 agrees with SD, we have s1  s2. That is, s1 ∼ s2, which implies that π(x, a, s1) =
8In some models, the condition that Q is decreasing in s follows from the fact that the policy func-
tion g is decreasing in the population state s (see Section 4). Xu and Hajek (2013) prove the unique-
ness of an equilibrium in a supermarket mean field game under a similar monotonicity condition on the
policy function. Their setting is different from ours because the players do not have individual states
nor they dynamically optimize.
9 Recall that µs is the unique fixed point of Ms and that s is an MFE if and only if µs = s.
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π(x, a, s2) and w(x, a, s1, ζ) = w(x, a, s2, ζ). Thus, under s1 the players play according to
the same strategy as under s2 (i.e., g(x, s1) = g(x, s2) for all x ∈ X). We conclude that
Q(x, s1, B) = Q(x, s2, B) for all x ∈ X and B ∈ B(X). X-ergodicity of Q implies that
Ms1 and Ms2 have a unique fixed point. Thus, µs1 = µs2, i.e., s1 = s2. Similarly, we can
show that s1  s2 implies that s1 = s2.
Since  is complete if s1 and s2 are two MFEs we have s2  s1 or s1  s2. Thus, we
proved that if s1 and s2 are two MFEs then s1 = s2. We conclude that if an MFE exists,
it is unique.
The assumptions on Q in Theorem 1 involve assumptions on the optimal strategy
g. Thus, these assumptions are not over the primitives of the model. In Section 4 we
introduce conditions on the primitives of dynamic oligopoly models that guarantee the
uniqueness of an MFE. In particular, we show that the monotonicity conditions over Q
arise naturally in important classes of these models. In Section 5 we apply our result to
prove the uniqueness of an MFE in heterogeneous agent macro models.
In some applications the assumption that the binary relation  is complete is re-
strictive. In the case that  is not complete and Assumption 2 holds, the following
Corollary shows that the MFEs are not comparable by the binary relation . This Corol-
lary can be used to derive properties on the MFE when there are multiple MFEs. For
example, suppose that there exist two functions Hi : P(X) → R, i = 1, 2 such that
π˜(x, a,H1(s)) = π(x, a, s) and w˜(x, a,H2(s), ζ) = w(x, a, s, ζ), where Hi is continuous
and increasing with respect to the stochastic dominance order SD. We can define an
order  on P(X) by defining s1  s2 if H1(s1) ≥ H1(s2) and H2(s1) ≥ H2(s2). Clearly,
this may not be a complete order. The following Corollary provides conditions that imply
that if s1 and s2 are two MFEs, then it cannot be the case that H1(s1) > H1(s2) and
H2(s1) > H2(s2). We write s1 ≻ s2 if s1  s2 and s2  s1.
Corollary 1 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. If s1 and s2 are two MFEs then s1 ⊁ s2
and s2 ⊁ s1.
Proof. Suppose, in contradiction, that s2 ≻ s1. The argument in the proof of Theo-
rem 1 implies that s1 SD s2. Since  agrees with SD, we have s1  s2, which is a
contradiction. We conclude that s2 ⊁ s1. Similarly, we can show that s1 ⊁ s2.
When the state space X is given by the product space X = X1×X2 where X1 and X2
are separable metric spaces, a modification of our uniqueness result can be applied to prove
the uniqueness of an MFE under weaker conditions than the conditions of Assumption 2.
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Assumption 2 requires that Q be increasing in x on X . However, when X = X1×X2,
and Xi is endowed with the closed partial order ≥i, it is enough to assume that Q is
increasing in xi on Xi for some i = 1, 2 to prove that the MFE is unique. We say that Q
is increasing in x1 if for all functions f : X1 × X2 → R that are increasing in x1, for all
s ∈ P(X), and for all x2 ∈ X2, the function∫
X
f(y1, y2)Q((x1, x2), s, d(y1, y2))
is increasing in x1.
In Sections 4.3 and 5 we show the usefulness of Theorem 2. We establish the uniqueness
of an MFE for dynamic reputation models and heterogeneous agent macro models by
proving that Q is increasing in xi for some i = 1, 2. In these models it is not necessarily
true that Q is increasing in x on X , so Theorem 1 cannot be applied directly. The
Appendix contains the proofs not presented in the main text.
Theorem 2 Suppose that X = X1 × X2. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds, apart from
the condition that Q is increasing in x. Suppose that Q is increasing in xi for some
i = 1, 2. If the binary relation  is complete, then if an MFE exists, it is unique.
3.2 The Existence of an MFE
In this section we study the existence of an MFE. We show that if G is single-valued, then
the operator Φ defined in Equation (1) has a fixed point and thus, there exists an MFE.
Theorem 3 Assume that G is single-valued. There exists a mean field equilibrium.
Note that we do not impose Assumption 2 for this result. Also note that X can be any
compact separable metric space in the proof of Theorem 3, so the existence result holds
for the important cases of finite state spaces, countable state spaces, and X ⊆ Rn. In
addition, the proof of existence does not depend on the number of players in the game; the
number of players in the game can be finite, countable or uncountable. Finally, we note
that we do not require X-ergodicity (see Definition 3) to show existence; instead we use
compactness and continuity (see Assumption 1). The main challenge to prove existence
is to prove the weak continuity of the nonlinear MFE operator. To do so, we leverage a
generalized version of the bounded convergence theorem by Serfozo (1982).
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We now provide conditions over the model primitives that guarantee that G is single-
valued when X is a convex set in Rn. Similar conditions have been used in dynamic
oligopoly models.10
Assumption 3 Suppose that X ⊆ Rn and is convex.
(i) Assume that π(x, a, s) is concave in (x, a), strictly concave in a and increasing in
x for each s ∈ P(X).
(ii) Assume that w is increasing in x and concave in (x, a) for each ζ ∈ E.
(iii) Γ(x) is convex-valued and increasing in the sense that x2 ≥ x1 implies Γ(x2) ⊇
Γ(x1).
The following Lemma shows that the preceding conditions on the primitives of the
model ensure that G is single-valued.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Assumption 3 holds. Then G is single-valued.
The previous results can be summarized by the following Corollary that imposes con-
ditions over the primitives of the model which guarantee the existence of an MFE.
Corollary 2 Suppose that Assumption 3 holds. Then, there exists an MFE.
3.3 Comparative Statics
In this section we derive comparative statics results. Let (I,I) be a partially ordered
set that influences the players’ optimal decisions. We denote a generic element in I by e.
For example, e can be the discount factor, a parameter that influences the players’ payoff
functions, or a parameter that influences the players’ transition dynamics. Throughout
this section we slightly abuse notation and when the parameter e influences the players’
optimal decisions we add it as a parameter. For instance, we write Q(x, s, e, ·) instead of
Q(x, s, ·). We say that Q is increasing in e if Q(x, s, e2, ·) SD Q(x, s, e1, ·) for all x, s,
and all e2, e1 ∈ I such that e2 I e1. We prove that under the assumptions of Theorem
1, if Q is increasing in e then e2 I e1 implies that the unique MFE under e2 is higher
than the unique MFE under e1 with respect to .
Adlakha and Johari (2013) derive comparative statics results for MFE in the case that
Q is increasing in s, x and e. They prove that e2 I e1 implies s(e2) SD s(e1) where
10For similar results in a countable state space setting see Adlakha et al. (2015) and
Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010)).
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s(e) is the maximal MFE with respect to SD under e. Adlakha and Johari (2013) use
the techniques to compare equilibria developed in Milgrom and Roberts (1994) (see also
Topkis (2011)). We note that under the assumptions of Theorem 1, Q is increasing in
x but decreasing in s. Thus, the results in Adlakha and Johari (2013) do not apply to
our setting. However, with the help of the uniqueness of an MFE, we derive a general
comparative statics result.
Theorem 4 Let (I,I) be a partial order. Assume that Q is increasing in e on I. Then,
under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the unique MFE s(e) is increasing in the following
sense: e2 I e1 implies s(e2)  s(e1).
The same result can be shown with a similar argument under the assumptions of
Theorem 2. We omit the details for sake of brevity. We note that our comparative statics
result is with respect to the order and not with respect to the usual stochastic dominance
order. The machinery mentioned in the paragraph above is not directly applicable in our
models, and without it we believe that comparative statics results with respect to the
usual stochastic dominance order are much harder to obtain. We discuss the usefulness
of our comparative static result with respect to the order  in the context of dynamic
oligopoly models below.
4 Dynamic Oligopoly Models
In this section we study various dynamic models of competition or dynamic oligopoly
models that capture a wide range of phenomena in economics and operations research.11
We leverage our results to provide conditions under which a broad class of dynamic
oligopoly models admit a unique MFE. We also provide comparative statics results.
More specifically, we show that under concavity assumptions and a natural substi-
tutability condition, the MFE is unique. The substitutability condition requires that the
firms’ profit function has decreasing differences in each firm’s own state and the states of
the other firms. This condition implies that the marginal profit of a firm (with respect to
its own state) is decreasing in the other firms’ states. It arises naturally in many dynamic
oligopoly models. In Section 4.1 we consider well studied capacity competition and qual-
ity ladder models. In Section 4.2 we consider a dynamic advertising model. In Section
11Even though we study models with potentially an infinite number of firms, we keep the name dy-
namic oligopoly to be consistent with previous literature in which MFE or its variants have been used
to approximate oligopolistic behavior.
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4.3 we introduce a dynamic reputation model of an online market. In all of these models,
it holds that the firms’ actions are higher when their own state is higher and the firms’
actions are lower when the competitors’ states (or the competitors’ actions) are higher.
These are essentially the conditions that imply the uniqueness of an MFE for dynamic
oligopoly models.
4.1 Capacity Competition and Quality Ladder Models
In this section we consider dynamic capacity competition models and dynamic quality
ladder models which have received significant attention in the recent operations research
and economics literature. In these models, firms’ states correspond to a variable that
affects their profits. For example, the state can be the firm’s capacity or the quality of
the firm’s product. Per-period profits are based on a static competition game that depends
on the heterogeneous firms’ state variables. Firms take actions in order to improve their
individual state over time.
We now describe the models we consider.
States. The state of firm i at time t is denoted by xi,t ∈ X where X ⊆ R+ and is
convex.
Actions. At each time t, firm i invests ai,t ∈ A = [0, a¯] to improve its state. The
investment changes the firm’s state in a stochastic fashion.
States’ dynamics. A firm’s state evolves in a Markov fashion. Let 0 < δ < 1 be the
depreciation rate. If firm i’s state at time t− 1 is xi,t−1, the firm takes an action ai,t−1 at
time t− 1, and ζi,t is firm i’s realized idiosyncratic random shock at time t, then firm i’s
state in the next period is given by:
xi,t = ((1− δ)xi,t−1 + k(ai,t−1))ζi,t
where k : A→ R is typically an increasing function that determines the impact of invest-
ment a. We assume that ζ takes positive values 0 < ζ1 < . . . < ζn, where ζ1 < 1, ζn > 1,
p1, pn > 0. That is, there exists a positive probability for a bad shock ζ1 and a positive
probability for a good shock ζn. In each period, the firm’s state is naturally depreciating
at rate δ, but the firm can make investments in order to improve it. Further, the outcome
of depreciation and investment is subject to an idiosyncratic random shock (ζ) that, for
example, could capture uncertainty in R&D or a marketing campaign. Related dynamics
have been used in previous literature. Further, our uniqueness result for capacity com-
petition and quality ladder models holds under other states’ dynamics. For example, we
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could also assume additive dynamics xi,t = (1− δ)xi,t−1 + k(ai,t−1) + ζi,t.
12 We make the
following assumption over the dynamics that we discuss later before Theorem 5.
Assumption 4 (i) k(a) is strictly concave, continuously differentiable, strictly increasing
and k(0) > 0.13
(ii) (1− δ)ζn < 1.
Payoff. The cost of a unit of investment is d > 0.14 We assume there is a single-period
profit function u(x, s) derived from a static game. When a firm invests a ∈ A, the firm’s
state is x ∈ X , and the population state is s ∈ P(X), then the firm’s single-period payoff
function is given by π(x, a, s) = u(x, s)− da.
We assume that there exists a complete and transitive binary relation  on P(X)
such that s1 ∼ s2 implies that u(x, s1) = u(x, s2) for all s1, s2 ∈ P(X) and x ∈ X .
Furthermore, we assume that  agrees with SD (cf. Section 3.1).
To prove the uniqueness of an MFE for capacity competition and quality ladder mod-
els, we introduce the following conditions on the primitives of the model. It is simple
to verify that both of the dynamic oligopoly models introduced in the examples below
satisfy these assumptions. We believe the conditions are quite natural, and thus other
commonly used dynamic oligopoly models may satisfy them as well.
Recall that a function f(x, s) is said to have decreasing differences in (x, s) on X × S
if for all x2 ≥ x1 and s2  s1 we have f(x2, s2)− f(x1, s2) ≤ f(x2, s1)− f(x1, s1). f is said
to have increasing differences if −f has decreasing differences.
Assumption 5 u(x, s) is jointly continuous. Further, it is concave and continuously
differentiable in x, for each s ∈ P(X). In addition, u(x, s) has decreasing differences in
(x, s).
We now provide two classic examples of profit functions u(x, s) that are commonly
used in the literature. For these examples, we explicitly define the binary relation .
Our first example is based on the capacity competition models of Besanko and Doraszelski
(2004) and Besanko et al. (2010). We consider an industry with homogeneous products,
where each firm’s state variable determines its production capacity. If the firm’s state is
12For our results to hold we need to impose some constraints on these additive dynamics so that the
state space remains compact. We can also assume an exogenous bound on the state as in Section 4.3.
13 The differentiability assumptions can be relaxed. We assume differentiability of u and k in order
to simplify the proof of Theorem 5.
14The investment cost could be a convex function, but linearity simplifies the comparative static
results in the parameter d.
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x, then its capacity is q¯(x) where q¯ is an increasing, continuously differentiable, concave,
and bounded function. In each period, firms compete in a capacity-constrained quantity
setting game. The inverse demand function is given by P (Q), where Q represents the
total industry output and P (·) is decreasing and continuous. For simplicity, we assume
that the marginal costs of all the firms are equal to zero. Given the total quantity pro-
duced by its competitors Q−i, the profit maximization problem for firm i is given by
max
0≤qi≤q¯(xi)
P (qi +Q−i)qi.
In general, one could solve for the equilibrium of the capacity-constrained static quan-
tity game played by firms, and these static equilibrium actions would determine the
single-period profits. However, we will focus on the limiting profit function obtained from
the asymptotic regime in which firms assume they do not have market power, that is,
they take Q as fixed. In this case, each firm produces at full capacity and the limiting
profit function is given by:
u(x, s) = P
(∫
q¯(y)s(dy)
)
q¯(x)
(see also Ifrach and Weintraub (2016)). For the capacity competition model, we define
s2  s1 if and only if
∫
q¯(y)s2(dy) ≥
∫
q¯(y)s1(dy). Since q¯ is an increasing function, 
agrees with SD. It can be verified that u satisfies the conditions of Assumption 5.
Our second example is a classic quality ladder model, where individual states represent
the quality of a firm’s product (see, e.g., Pakes and McGuire (1994) and Ericson and Pakes
(1995)). Consider a price competition under a logit demand system. There are N con-
sumers in the market. The utility of consumer j from consuming the good produced by
firm i at period t is given by
uijt = θ1 ln(xit + 1) + θ2 ln(Y − pit) + vijt,
where θ1 < 1, θ2 > 0, pit is the price of the good produced by firm i, Y is the consumer’s
income, xit is the quality of the good produced by firm i, and {vijt}i,j,t are i.i.d Gumbel
random variables that represent unobserved characteristics for each consumer-good pair.
There are m firms in the market and the marginal production cost is constant and the
same across firms. There is a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the pricing
game (see Caplin and Nalebuff (1991)). These equilibrium static prices determine the
single-period profits. Now, the limiting profit function that we focus on can be obtained
from the asymptotic regime in which the number of consumers N and the number of firms
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m grow to infinity at the same rate. The limiting profit function corresponds to a logit
model of monopolistic competition given by:
u(x, s) =
c˜(x+ 1)θ1∫
X
(y + 1)θ1s(dy)
(see Besanko et al. (1990)). c˜ is a constant that depends on the limiting equilibrium
price, the marginal production cost, the consumer’s income, and θ2. For the quality
ladder model, we define s2  s1 if and only if
∫
(y + 1)θ1s2(dx) ≥
∫
(y + 1)θ1s1(dy). It is
easy to see that  agrees with SD. It can also be verified that u satisfies the conditions
of Assumption 5.
The proof of our uniqueness result for the capacity competition and quality ladder
models consists of showing that Assumptions 4 and 5 imply Assumptions 1 and 2, and
that  is a complete order. These are the conditions we use to show the existence of a
unique MFE in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Specifically, similarly to Lemma 1, one can show that the concavity assumptions in
Assumptions 4 and 5 imply that G is single-valued. The assumption that k(0) > 0
(see condition (i) in Assumption 4) is used to prevent the pathological case that the
Dirac measure on the point 0 is an invariant distribution of Ms which could violate X-
ergodicity (see Section 3.1). In addition, condition (ii) in Assumption 4 is used to control
the growth of firms, so that one can show that the state space remains compact. We
believe our results hold with a milder version of this assumption. With this, the only
remaining assumption that we need to show in order to prove the uniqueness of an MFE
for our capacity competition and quality ladder models is Assumption 2(i). For this, we
use the fact that the profit function has decreasing differences in the state x and the
population state s. This implies that firms invest less when the population state is higher
(see Lemma 3). We use this fact to show the desired monotonicity of Q.
Our main result for dynamic capacity competition and dynamic quality ladder models
is the following:
Theorem 5 Suppose that Assumptions 4 and 5 hold. Then there exists a unique MFE
for the capacity competition and quality ladder models.
Under Assumptions 4 and 5 we can also derive comparative statics results for our
capacity competition and quality ladder models. In particular, we show that an increase
in the cost of a unit of investment decreases the unique MFE population state. Note
that an increase in the investment cost decreases firms incentives to invest. However, a
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lower population state incentivizes the firms to invest more. As a consequence, our model
does not have the properties of a supermodular game (e.g., Topkis (1979)). Despite this,
relying on the uniqueness of an MFE and on Theorem 4 we are able to show that in fact
the unique MFE decreases when the cost of a unit of investment increases.
We also derive comparative statics results regarding a change in a parameter that
influences the profit function and a change in the discount factor. We show that if there
is a parameter c such that the marginal profit of the firms is decreasing in that parameter,
then the unique MFE decreases in the parameter c. For example, in the quality ladder
model, as the marginal cost of production goes up, the unique MFE decreases. In the
capacity competition model, as the potential market size increases, the MFE increases.
In addition, we show that an increase in the discount factor increases the unique MFE.
We note that all of our comparative statics results are with respect to the order  and
not with respect to the usual stochastic dominance order as one would typically obtain
using supermodularity arguments (e.g., Adlakha and Johari (2013)). We believe that
these results provide helpful information because the order  relates to the single-period
profit function, and therefore, MFE can be ordered in terms of firms’ payoffs. Further, 
typically orders a variable of economic interest, such as the average capacity level in the
capacity competition model or the average quality level in the quality ladder model.
Theorem 6 Suppose that Assumptions 4 and 5 hold. We denote by s(e) the unique MFE
when the parameter that influences the firms’ decisions is e.
(i) If the cost of a unit of investment increases, then the unique MFE decreases, i.e.,
d2 ≤ d1 implies s(d2)  s(d1).
(ii) Let c ∈ I ⊆ R be a parameter that influences the firms’ profit function. If the profit
function u(x, s, c) has decreasing differences in (x, c), then the unique MFE decreases in
c, i.e., c1 ≥ c2 implies s(c2)  s(c1).
(iii) Assume that u(x, s) is increasing in x. If the discount factor β increases, then
the unique MFE s(β) increases, i.e., β2 ≥ β1 implies s(β2)  s(β1).
4.2 Dynamic Advertising Competition Models
In this section we consider dynamic advertising competition models. In these models,
firms’ states correspond to customer goodwill or market share. In each period, the firms
decide on their advertising expenditures a. The probability that the next period’s cus-
tomer goodwill is higher increases when the firms spend more on advertising. The firms’
payoff functions depend on their own spending on advertising, on their own state, on the
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other firms’ states, and on the other firms’ spending on advertising. Thus, a firm’s payoff
function depends on the other firms’ dynamic actions (in Sections 2.2 and A.1 we extend
the model and the results presented in Sections 2 and 3 to the case in which each player’s
payoff function depends on the other players’ actions). Variants of dynamic models with
this structure have been studied in the operations research literature in contexts other
than advertising (for example, see Hall and Porteus (2000)). We now describe our specific
model (our model is a mean field version of the models in Heyman and Sobel (2004) and
Olsen and Parker (2014)).
States. The state of firm i at time t is denoted by xi,t ∈ X where X = R+. The state
of a firm xi,t ∈ X represents the customer goodwill.
Actions. At each time t, firm i chooses an amount of money to spend on advertising
ai,t ∈ A = [1, a¯] where a¯ > 1.
States’ dynamics. When the firm spends more on advertising, the customer goodwill
increases. The customer goodwill depreciates over time at rate 0 < δ < 1. If firm i’s
state at time t − 1 is xi,t−1, the firm takes an action ai,t−1 at time t − 1, and ζi,t is firm
i’s realized idiosyncratic random shock at time t, then firm i’s state in the next period is
given by
xi,t = (1− δ)(xi,t−1 + ai,t−1)ζi,t.
We assume that ζ takes positive values 0 < ζ1 < . . . < ζn. To ensure compactness we also
assume that (1 − δ)ζn < 1 (see Section 4.1). We slightly modify the transition dynamics
from Section 4.1 to remain consistent with the models used in the papers that motivate
this section.
Payoff. When a firm chooses to spend a ∈ A on advertising, the firm’s state is x ∈ X ,
and the population action-state profile is s ∈ P(X × A), then the firm’s single-period
payoff function is given by
π(x, a, s) = r
(x+ a)γ1
(
∫
(x′ + a′)s(d(x′, a′)))γ2
− a
where (x+a)
γ1
(
∫
(x′+a′)s(d(x′,a′)))γ2
is the expected demand, r > 0 is the price, and 0 < γ1 < 1,
0 < γ2 < 1 are parameters. The expected demand is increasing in the firm’s current
advertising expenditure and in the firm’s current state, and is decreasing in the other
firms’ advertising expenditures and the other firms’ states.
We define a complete binary relation  on P(X × A), by s1  s2 if and only if
(
∫
(x′ + a′)s1(d(x
′, a′)))γ2 ≥ (
∫
(x′ + a′)s2(d(x
′, a′)))γ2 . Clearly,  agrees with SD (see
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Section 3.1). We can also derive comparative statics results for the dynamic advertising
model. For example, using similar arguments to the arguments in Section 4.1 we can show
that when the discount factor β increases, then the unique MFE increases in the following
sense: if β2 > β1, then s(β2)  s(β1) where s(β) is the unique MFE under discount factor
β. We also show that the unique MFE increases when the market price r increases.
Theorem 7 (i) The dynamic advertising competition model has a unique MFE.
(ii) Let s(β) be the unique MFE under the discount factor β. Then β2 > β1 implies
s(β2)  s(β1).
(iii) Let s(r) be the unique MFE under the price r. Then r2 > r1 implies s(r2)  s(r1).
4.3 A Dynamic Reputation Model
In this section we consider a dynamic reputation model. Motivated by the proliferation of
online markets, reputation models and the design of reputation systems have recently been
widely studied in the operations and management science literature.15 These systems can
mitigate the mistrust between buyers and sellers participating in the marketplace (see
Tadelis (2016)). Further, online markets typically consist of many small sellers, and
therefore, assuming an MFE limit is natural.
We study a dynamic reputation model in which sellers improve their reputation level
over time. The state of each seller consists of the average review given to her in the past
history and the total number of reviews she has received.16 In each period, each seller
receives a review from buyers.17 A seller’s ranking is a simple average of her past reviews.
Sellers invest in their products in order to improve their reviews over time. For example,
Airbnb hosts can invest in cleaning their apartments, and sellers on eBay can invest in
their packaging. Higher investments increase the probability of receiving a good review.
Sellers’ payoffs depend on their rankings and on the number of reviews they receive as
well as on the other sellers’ rankings and number of reviews. Each seller’s payoff function
increases in her ranking and in her number of reviews and decreases in the other sellers’
rankings and number of reviews. This can capture, for example, the fact that a seller
with a higher ranking can charge a higher price or garner more demand.
15For example, see Dellarocas (2003), Aperjis and Johari (2010), Bolton et al. (2013),
Papanastasiou et al. (2017), and Besbes and Scarsini (2018).
16Typically, review systems report simple averages; the number of reviews may also be relevant as it
may signal more sales and more experience from a seller.
17 This assumption is made only for simplicity. We can also assume that reviews arrive according to
a Poisson process.
25
The dynamic reputation model we consider in this section assumes that sellers arrive
and depart over time. We make this modeling choice because of its realistic appeal, and
to ensure that the number of reviews does not tend to infinity. Because we study a
stationary setting, we assume that the sellers’ rates of arrival and departure balance, so
that the market size remains constant over time (in expectation). After each review, a
seller departs the market and never returns with probability 1 − β where 0 < β < 1.
For each seller i that departs, a new seller immediately arrives. We assign the new
seller the same label i, and a 0 ranking, and 0 reviews. Under this assumption, it is
straightforward to show that the seller’s decision problem is the same stationary, infinite
horizon, expected discounted reward maximization problem that we introduced in Section
2, where the discount factor is the probability of remaining in the market.18
We now describe the dynamic reputation model in more detail.
States. The state of seller i at time t is denoted by xi,t = (xi,t,1, xi,t,2) ∈ X1×X2 = X .
xi,t,1 represents seller i’s average numerical review up to time t (for example, the average
number of stars seller i has at period t). xi,t,2 represents the number of reviews seller i
has at period t.
Actions. At each time t, seller i chooses an action ai,t ∈ A = [0, a¯] in order to improve
her ranking. The action changes the seller’s state in a stochastic fashion.
States’ dynamics. If seller i’s state at time t − 1 is xi,t−1, the seller takes an action
ai,t−1 at time t−1, and ζi,t is seller i’s realized idiosyncratic random shock at time t, then
seller i’s state in the next period is given by
xi,t =
(
min
((
xi,t,2
1 + xi,t,2
xi,t,1 +
1
1 + xi,t,2
k(a)
)
ζi,t,M1
)
,min (xi,t,2 + 1,M2)
)
where k : A→ R is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function that determines the
impact of the seller’s investment a on the next period’s review. We assume that ζ takes
positive values 0 < ζ1 < . . . < ζn. M1 > 0 is the upper bound on the sellers’ ranking and
M2 > 0 is the upper bound on the sellers’ number of reviews. The latter are useful to keep
the state space compact. The first term in the dynamics represents the simple average of
the numerical reviews received so far, while the second term represents the total number
of reviews. Similarly to the previous models, the random shocks represent uncertainty on
the review process.
Payoff. The cost of a unit of investment is d > 0. When the seller’s ranking is x1, the
seller’s number of reviews is x2, the seller chooses an action a ∈ A, and the population
18For example, Iyer et al. (2014) provide a similar regenerative model of arrivals and departures.
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state is s ∈ P(X), then the seller’s single-period payoff is given by
π(x, a, s) =
ν(x1, x2)∫
ν(x1, x2)s(d(x1, x2))
− da
where ν is increasing in x1 and x2, concave, continuously differentiable in x1, and positive.
The functional form resembles the logit model studied in Section 4.1.
The cost of a unit of investment can be seen as a lever that a platform may impact by
design. In particular, a platform can reduce the cost of a unit of investment for the sellers
by introducing tools to improve the buyers’ experience of using the sellers’ products. For
example, an e-commerce platform could help facilitating logistics for its sellers, and a
rental sharing platform could help its hosts connecting cleaning services.
We define a complete and transitive binary relation  on P(X) by s1  s2 if and only
if
∫
ν(x1, x2)s1(d(x1, x2)) ≥
∫
ν(x1, x2)s2(d(x1, x2)). It is easy to see that  agrees with
SD (see Section 3.1).
We use Theorem 2 to prove that the dynamic reputation model admits a unique
MFE.19 We also show that when the platform reduces the cost of a unit of investment
then the MFE increases.
Theorem 8 (i) The dynamic reputation model has a unique MFE.
(ii) Let s(d) be the unique MFE under the unit of investment cost d. Then d2 ≥ d1
implies s(d2)  s(d1).
5 Heterogeneous Agent Macroeconomic Models
In this section we consider heterogeneous agent macro models. In these models, there
is a continuum of agents facing idiosyncratic risks only (and no aggregate risks). The
heterogeneous agents make decisions given certain market prices (in Aiyagari (1994), for
example, the market prices are the interest rate and the wage rate). The market prices
are determined by the aggregate decisions of all the agents in the market. We consider
a setting similar to the one presented in Acemoglu and Jensen (2015). We note that
this setting encompasses many important models in the economics literature. Examples
include Bewley-Aiyagari models (see Bewley (1986), and Aiyagari (1994)), and models of
industry equilibrium (see Hopenhayn (1992)). While Acemoglu and Jensen (2015) derive
19For this model we are able to show the monotonicity of the kernel Q with respect to x1 but not
with respect to x2.
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important existence and comparative statics results for these models, to the best of our
knowledge there are no general uniqueness results. In this Section we show that if the
agents’ strategy is decreasing in the aggregator (in the sense of Acemoglu and Jensen
(2015)), there exists a unique equilibrium.
We now describe our specific model.
States. The state of player i at time t is denoted by xi,t = (xi,t,1, xi,t,2) ∈ X1×X2 = X
where X1 ⊆ R and X2 ⊆ Rn−1. For example, in Bewley models xi,t,1 typically represents
agent i’s savings at period t and x2 represents agent i’s income or labor productivity at
period t (in this case n = 2).
Actions. At each time t, player i chooses an action ai,t ∈ Γ(xi,t) ⊂ R.
States’ dynamics. The state of a player evolves in a Markovian fashion. If player i’s
state at time t− 1 is xi,t−1, player i takes an action ai,t−1 at time t− 1, and ζi,t is player
i’s realized idiosyncratic random shock at time t, then player i’s state in the next period
is given by
(xi,t,1, xi,t,2) = (ai,t−1, m(xi,t−1,2, ζi,t)),
where m : X2×E → X2 is a continuous function. For example, in Bewley models, in each
period agents choose how much to save for future consumption and how much to consume
in the current period. The agents’ labor productivity evolves exogenously and the labor
productivity function m determines the next period’s labor productivity given the current
labor productivity. So if an agent chooses to save a, ζ is the realized random shock, and
her current labor productivity is x2, then the agent’s next period state (savings-labor
productivity pair) is given by (a,m(x2, ζ)).
Payoff. As in Acemoglu and Jensen (2015), we assume that the payoff function de-
pends on the population state through an aggregator. That is, if the population state is
s, then the aggregator is given by H(s) where H : P(X) → R is a continuous function.
If the aggregator is H(s), the player’s state is x ∈ X , and the player takes an action
a ∈ Γ(x), then the player’s single-period payoff function is given by π˜(x, a,H(s)).
We define a complete and transitive binary relation  on P(X) by s1  s2 if and only
if H(s1) ≥ H(s2). We assume that  agrees with SD. This assumption holds in most
of the heterogeneous agent macro models, where H is usually assumed to be increasing
with respect to first order stochastic dominance (see Acemoglu and Jensen (2015)).
Note that under the states’ dynamics defined above, and assuming that g(x, s) =
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g˜(x,H(s)) is the optimal stationary strategy, the transition kernel Q is given by
Q(x1, x2, s, B1 × B2) = 1B1(g˜(x1, x2, H(s))
∑
j
pj1B2(m(x2, ζj)),
where B1 × B2 ∈ B(X1 ×X2).
We show that the model has a unique MFE if the optimal strategy is decreasing in
the aggregator, i.e., if H(s2) ≥ H(s1) implies g˜(x1, x2, H(s2)) ≤ g˜(x1, x2, H(s1)), Q is
X-ergodic, and g˜ is increasing in x1. We note that we cannot apply Theorem 1 to this
model, since in most applications the optimal stationary strategy g˜ is not increasing in
x2, and thus Q may not be increasing in x2. However, in most applications (for example,
all the applications discussed in Acemoglu and Jensen (2015)) g˜ is increasing in x1. Thus,
we can use Theorem 2 to show that the heterogeneous agent macro model has a unique
MFE under the conditions stated above.20
Corollary 3 Assume that G is single-valued, Q is X-ergodic, and g˜ is increasing in x1
and decreasing in the aggregator. Then the heterogeneous agent macro model has a unique
MFE.
In most applications, the payoff function π˜ has increasing differences in (x1, a) which
ensures that g˜ is increasing in x1. The condition that Q is X-ergodic also usually holds
in applications. For example, Aiyagari (1994) proves that Q is X-ergodic in his model.
Thus, in many applications, in order to ensure uniqueness, one only needs to check that
g˜ is decreasing in the aggregator. In the next section we illustrate this in a Bewley-type
model introduced in Aiyagari (1994).
5.1 A Bewley-Aiyagari Model
Bewley models are widely studied and used in the modern macroeconomics literature
(for a survey see Heathcote et al. (2009)). As previously mentioned, in Bewley models
agents receive a state-dependent income in each period and they solve an infinite horizon
consumption-savings problem; that is, the agents must decide how much to save and
how much to consume in each period. The agents can transfer assets from one period to
another only by investing in a risk-free bond, and have some borrowing limit. Aiyagari
20 Note that an MFE is usually called a stationary equilibrium in the economics literature (e.g.,
Acemoglu and Jensen (2015)).
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(1994) extends the Bewley model to a general equilibrium model with production. We
now describe the model of Aiyagari (1994) in the setting of a mean field game.
In a Bewley-Aiyagari model, x1 represents the agents’ savings and x2 represents the
agents’ labor productivity. m(x2, ζ) represents the labor productivity function. That is,
if the current labor productivity is x2 then the next period’s labor productivity is given
by m(x2, ζj) with probability pj. If the agents’ labor productivity is x2 then their income
is given by wx2 where w > 0 is the wage rate. The agents’ savings rate of return is R > 0.
In each period t, the agents choose their next period’s savings level a ∈ Γ(x1, x2)
where Γ(x1, x2) = [−b,min{Rx1 + wx2, b¯}], and consume c = Rx1 + wx2 − a. That is,
the agents’ savings are lower than their cash-on-hand Rx1 + wx2 and higher than the
borrowing constraint b ≥ 0. b¯ is an upper bound on savings that ensures compactness.
The wage rate and the interest rate are determined in general equilibrium. There is
a representative firm with a production function F (K,N) that is homogeneous of degree
one. N is the labor supply and K is the capital. We assume that F is twice continuously
differentiable, strictly concave, and strictly increasing. The first order conditions of the
firm’s maximization problem yield21 Fk(K,N) = R+δ−1 and FN (K,N) = w where δ > 0
is the depreciation rate and Fi(K,N) denotes the partial derivative of F with respect to
i = K,N . A standard argument22 shows that R = f ′(K)−δ+1 and w = f(K)−f ′(K)K
where F (K, 1) = f(K).
In equilibrium we have
∫
X
x1s(d(x1, x2)) = K where s is an invariant savings-labor
productivities distribution. That is, the aggregate supply of savings equals the total
capital. We define H(s) =
∫
X
x1s(d(x1, x2)). It is easy to see that  agrees with SD
(see Section 3.1).
The agents’ utility from consumption is given by a utility function u which is assumed
to be strictly concave and strictly increasing. If the agents choose to save a then their
consumption in the current period is Rx1+wx2−a. Thus, using the equilibrium conditions
R = f ′(H(s))− δ + 1 and w = f(H(s))− f ′(H(s))H(s), in a Bewley-Aiyagari model the
payoff function π˜ is given by
π˜(x, a,H(s)) = u ((f ′(H(s))− δ + 1)x1 + (f(H(s))− f
′(H(s))H(s))x2 − a) .
It is easy to establish that G is single-valued and that Assumption 1 holds. Thus, the
21The firm’s maximization problem is given by maxK,N F (K,N) − (R − 1 + δ)K − wN . For more
details see, for example, Acemoglu and Jensen (2015) and Light (2018).
22Since F is homogeneous of degree one we have F (K, 1) = KFK(K, 1) + FN (K, 1). Using the first
order conditions we have f(K) = Kf ′(K) + w.
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existence of an equilibrium in a Bewley-Aiyagari model follows from Theorem 3.23
Under mild technical conditions on the utility function (for example, if u is bounded
or if u belongs to the constant relative risk aversion class), the X-ergodicity of Q can be
proven in a similar manner to Acikgoz (2018). It can be established also that the next
period’s savings are increasing in the current period’s savings, i.e., g˜ is increasing in x1.
Thus, to prove the uniqueness of an MFE in a Bewley-Aiyagari model, one needs to prove
that g˜ is decreasing in the aggregator H(s). In a recent paper, Light (2018) proves the
uniqueness of an MFE for the special case that the agents’ utility function is in the CRRA
(constant relative risk aversion) class with a relative risk aversion coefficient that is less
than or equal to one, and the production function’s elasticity of substitution is bounded
below by 1. Under these assumptions, we can use the results in Light (2018) to show
that g˜ is decreasing in the aggregator H(s). Then, we can use Corollary 3 to prove the
uniqueness of an MFE. As a note for future research, our results suggest that the result in
Light (2018) could be generalized, weakening the conditions on the relative risk aversion
and on the production function. With this, we believe our approach could be used to
show uniqueness for a broader class of heterogeneous agent macro models. Finally, we
note that the uniqueness result in Hopenhayn (1992) can be obtained from Corollary 3
also. For the sake of brevity we omit the details here.
6 Conclusions
This paper studies the existence and uniqueness of an MFE in stochastic games with
a general state space. We provide conditions that ensure the uniqueness of an MFE.
We also prove that there exists an MFE under continuity and concavity conditions on
the primitives of the model. We show that a general class of dynamic oligopoly models
satisfies these conditions, and thus, these models have a unique MFE. Furthermore, we
prove the existence of a unique MFE in heterogeneous agent macro models. We also
derive general comparative statics results regarding the MFE and apply them to dynamic
oligopoly models.
We believe that our results can be applied to other models in operations research
and economics. For example, in order to analyze market design problems in online plat-
forms, like in the reputation model we studied, it is natural to assume a large-scale MFE
23Some of the previous existence results rely on the X-ergodicity of Q (e,g., Acikgoz (2018)) or on
monotonicity arguments (e.g., Acemoglu and Jensen (2015)). The proof presented in this paper shows
that these conditions are not needed in order to establish the existence of an equilibrium.
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limit. Typical questions of interest in these contexts involve the market’s response to
platforms’ market design choices. Hence, knowing that this response is unique and that
one can predict its directional changes could significantly strengthen the analysis of these
platforms.
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A Appendix: Extensions
In this section we extend the model presented in Section 2. In Section A.1 we study a
model where the players are coupled through actions and in Section A.2 we study a model
where the players are ex-ante heterogeneous.
A.1 Coupling Through Actions
In this section we consider a model where the transition function and the payoff function
of each player depend on both the states and the actions of all other players. The model
is the same as the original model in Section 2 except that now the probability measure s
describes the joint distribution of players over actions and states and not only over states,
that is, s ∈ P(X ×A). Thus, the transition function w(x, a, s, ζ) and the payoff function
π(x, a, s) depend on the joint distribution over state-action pairs s ∈ P(X ×A). We refer
to s ∈ P(X × A) as the population action-state profile and to the marginal distribution
of the population action-state profile over X as the population state (i.e., the population
state’s distribution is described by the probability measure s (·, A)).
An MFE is defined similarly to the definition in Section 2. In an MFE, every player
conjectures that s is the fixed long run population action-state profile, and plays according
to a stationary strategy g. If every player plays according to the strategy g when the
population action-state profile is s, then s constitutes an invariant distribution.
Given the stationary strategy g, s ∈ P(X ×A) is an invariant distribution if
s (B ×D) =
∫
X
∫
B
1D(g (y, s))Q (x, s, dy) s (dx, A) =
∫
X
Q(x, s, B ×D)s(dx, A) , (2)
for all B ×D ∈ B(X × A) where Q(x, s, B) = Pr(w(x, s, g(x, s), ζ) ∈ B) and24
Q (x, s, B ×D) =
∫
B
1D(g (y, s))Q (x, s, dy) .
To see that Equation (2) holds, first assume that X and A are discrete sets. The joint
24 Note that Q is a Markov kernel on X ×A.
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probability mass function of a stationary distribution s (y, a) is given by
s(y, a) = s(y, A)s(a|y) = s(y, A)1{a}(g(y, s))
where s(a|y) is the probability of playing the action a ∈ A given that the state is y ∈ X .
Since the players use the pure strategy g we have s(a|y) = 1{a}(g(y, s)). Thus,
s(B ×D) =
∑
y∈B
∑
a∈D
s(y, A)1{a}(g(y, s)) =
∑
y∈B
s(y, A)1D(g(y, s)).
In addition, since s is invariant, the marginal distribution s (·, A) must satisfy s(y, A) =∑
x∈X s(x,A)Q(x, s, y). Thus,
s(B ×D) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈B
1D (g (y, s))Q(x, s, y)s(x,A).
Similarly, Equation (2) holds in the general state space.
If A is compact then X ×A is compact, and thus, P (X × A) is compact in the weak
topology. Similar arguments to the arguments in the proof of Theorem 3 show that the
operator Φ : P(X)→ P(X) defined by
Φs(B ×D) =
∫
X
Q(x, s, B ×D)s(dx, A).
is continuous (see more details in the proof of Theorem 9). Thus, as in the proof of
Theorem 3, we can apply Schauder-Tychonoff’s fixed point theorem to prove that Φ has
a fixed point.
The uniqueness result holds under the same conditions as the conditions in Theorem 1
except that the assumptions on the Markov kernel Q in Assumption 2 part (i) are assumed
on the Markov kernel Q. The proof of Theorem 9 part (i) is essentially the same as the
proof of Theorem 1. Similarly, Theorem 9 part (iii) holds when the assumptions on the
Markov kernel Q are assumed on the Markov kernel Q.
We summarize the discussion in the following Theorem.
Theorem 9 Consider the model described in this section. Suppose that the action set A
is compact.
(i) Under the assumptions of Theorem 1 where Q is replaced by Q the MFE is unique.
(ii) Under the assumptions of Theorem 3 there exists an MFE.
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(iii) Assume that Q is increasing in e on I.Then, under the assumptions of part (i),
the unique MFE s(e) is increasing in the following sense: e2 I e1 implies s(e2)  s(e1).
25
The assumptions on Q that are needed in order to guarantee the uniqueness of an
MFE can be verified in a similar manner to the assumptions on Q. In particular, in some
models it is enough to show that the policy function g(x, s) is increasing in the state x
and decreasing in the population action-state profile state s which is a natural property in
many dynamic oligopoly models (see Section 4). In Section 4.2 we prove that the policy
function g(x, s) is increasing in x and decreasing in s in a dynamic advertising model
where each player’s payoff function depends on the other players’ actions, and we use
Theorem 9 to prove that the model has a unique MFE.
A.2 Ex-ante Heterogeneity
In this section we study a mean field model with ex-ante heterogeneous players. We
assume that the players are heterogeneous in their payoff functions and in their transition
functions. Assume that before the the time horizon, each player has a type θ ∈ Θ, where Θ
is a finite set. Each player’s type is fixed throughout the horizon. Let Υ be the probability
mass function over the type space; Υ(θ) is the mass of players whose type is θ ∈ Θ, which
is common knowledge. Adding the argument θ ∈ Θ to the functions defined in Section
2, we can modify the definitions of Section 2 to include the ex-ante heterogeneity of the
players. In particular, we denote by w(x, a, s, ζ, θ) the transition function of type θ ∈ Θ
and by π(x, a, s, θ) the payoff function of type θ ∈ Θ.
Let Xh = X × Θ be an extended state space for the mean field model with ex-ante
heterogeneous players. If a player’s extended state is xh = (x, θ) ∈ Xh then the player’s
state is x and the player’s type is θ. Let sh be the population state over the extended
state space, i.e., sh ∈ P(X ×Θ).
For a probability measure sh ∈ P(X×Θ), define a probability measure S (sh) ∈ P(X)
by
S (sh) (B) =
∑
θ∈Θ
sh(B, θ)
for all B ∈ B(X). That is, S(sh) is the marginal distribution of sh that describes the
population state.
25 Recall that we say that Q is increasing in e if Q(x, s, e2, ·) SD Q(x, s, e1, ·) for all x, s, and all
e2, e1 ∈ I such that e2 I e1. Note that the orders SD and  are on measures over state-action pairs.
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For the model with ex-ante heterogeneous players we define the payoff function πh (xh, a, sh) =
π(x, a, S (sh) , θ). We now define the transition function.
For a fixed extended population state sh ∈ P(X×Θ) and a strategy g(x, S (sh) , θ), the
probability that player i’s next period’s state will lie in a set B×D ∈ B(X)×2Θ, given that
her current state is xh ∈ Xh, her type is θ, and she takes the action a = g(x, S (sh) , θ), is:
Qh(xh, sh, B ×D) = Pr(w(x, g(x, S (sh) , θ), S (sh) , ζ, θ) ∈ B)1D (θ) .
These definitions map the payoff function and transition function in the model with
ex-ante heterogeneous players to the model with ex-ante homogeneous players that we
considered in Section 2. Thus, all the results in this paper hold also in the case of ex-ante
heterogeneity where the assumptions that we made on π, w and Q are now assumed on
πh, wh and Qh. In fact, it can be verified that if the primitives of the model satisfy
Assumptions 1, 2, 3 for every type θ, then the assumptions hold for the extended model.
Thus, all our results can be easily extended to the case of ex-ante heterogeneous players.
We omit the details for the sake of brevity. Note that in this model, players with different
types may play different MFE strategies.
B Appendix: Proofs
B.1 Uniqueness: Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume without loss of generality that Q is increasing in x1.
For s1, s2 ∈ P(X) we write s1 SD,X1 s2 if for all functions f : X1 × X2 → R that
are increasing in the first argument (i.e., x′1 ≥ x1 implies that f(x
′
1, x2) ≥ f(x1, x2) for all
x2 ∈ X) we have ∫
X
f(x1, x2)s1(d(x1, x2)) ≥
∫
X
f(x1, x2)s2(d(x1, x2)).
We note that if  agrees with SD, then  agrees with SD,X1 (recall that s2 SD s1 if
the last inequality holds for every increasing function f : X1 ×X2 → R).
Let f : X1 ×X2 → R be increasing in the first argument, θ1, θ2 ∈ P(X) and assume
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that θ1 SD,X1 θ2. Let s1, s2 be two MFEs such that s2  s1. We have∫
X
f(y1, y2)Ms2θ2(d(y1, y2)) =
∫
X
∫
X
f(y1, y2)Q((x1, x2), s2, d(y1, y2))θ2(d(x1, x2))
≤
∫
X
∫
X
f(y1, y2)Q((x1, x2), s2, d(y1, y2))θ1(d(x1, x2))
≤
∫
X
∫
X
f(y1, y2)Q((x1, x2), s1, d(y1, y2))θ1(d(x1, x2))
=
∫
f(x1, x2)Ms1θ1(d(x1, x2)).
Thus, Ms1θ1 SD,X1 Ms2θ2. The first inequality follows from the facts that f is increasing
in the first argument, Q is increasing in x1, and θ1 SD,X1 θ2. The second inequality
follows from the fact that Q is decreasing in s.
We conclude that Mns1θ1 SD,X1 M
n
s2
θ2 for all n ∈ N. Q being X-ergodic implies that
Mnsiθi converges weakly to µsi = si. Since SD,X1 is a closed order, we have s1 SD,X1 s2
which implies that s1  s2. The rest of the proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 1.
B.2 Existence: Proofs of Theorem 3 and Lemma 1
We first introduce preliminary notation and results.
Let B(X × P(X)) be the space of all bounded functions on X × P(X). Define the
operator T : B(X × P(X))→ B(X ×P(X)) by
Tf(x, s) = max
a∈Γ(x)
h(x, a, s, f)
where
h(x, a, s, f) = π(x, a, s) + β
n∑
j=1
pjf(w(x, a, s, ζj), s).
The operator T is called the Bellman operator.
Lemma 2 The optimal strategy correspondence G(x, s) is non-empty, compact-valued and
upper hemicontinuous.
Proof. Assume that f ∈ B(X × P(X)) is (jointly) continuous. Then for each ζ ∈
E, f(w(x, a, s, ζ), s) is continuous as the composition of continuous functions. Thus,
h(x, a, s, f) is continuous as the sum of continuous functions. Since Γ(x) is continuous,
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the maximum theorem (see Theorem 17.31 in Aliprantis and Border (2006)) implies that
Tf(x, s) is jointly continuous.
We conclude that for all n = 1, 2, 3 . . ., T nf is continuous. Under Assumption 1,
standard dynamic programming arguments (see Bertsekas and Shreve (1978)) show that
T nf converges to V uniformly. Since the set of continuous functions is closed under uni-
form convergence, V is continuous. Thus, h(x, a, s, V ) is continuous. From the maximum
theorem, G(x, s) is non-empty, compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous.
We say that kn : X → R converges continuously to k if kn(xn) → k(x) whenever
xn → x. The following Proposition is a special case of Theorem 3.3 in Serfozo (1982).
Proposition 1 Assume that kn : X → R is a uniformly bounded sequence of functions.
If kn : X → R converges continuously to k and sn converges weakly to s then
lim
n→∞
∫
X
kn(x)sn(dx) =
∫
X
k(x)s(dx).
In order to establish the existence of an MFE, we will use the following Proposition
(see Corollary 17.56 in Aliprantis and Border (2006)).
Proposition 2 (Schauder-Tychonoff) Let K be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of
a locally convex Hausdorff space, and let f : K → K be a continuous function. Then the
set of fixed points of f is compact and nonempty.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let g(x, s) = G(x, s) be the unique optimal stationary strategy.
From Lemma 2, g is continuous.
Consider the operator Φ : P(X)→ P(X) defined by
Φs(B) =
∫
X
Qg(x, s, B)s(dx).
If s is a fixed point of Φ then s is an MFE. Since X is compact P(X) is compact (i.e.,
compact in the weak topology, see Aliprantis and Border (2006)). Clearly P(X) is convex.
P(X) endowed with the weak topology is a locally convex Hausdorff space. If Φ is
continuous, we can apply Schauder-Tychonoff’s fixed point theorem to prove that Φ has
a fixed point. We now show that Φ is continuous.
First, note that for every bounded and measurable function f : X → R and for every
s ∈ P(X) we have∫
X
f(x)Φs(dx) =
∫
X
∑
j
pjf(w(x, g(x, s), s, ζj)s(dx). (3)
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To see this, first assume that f = 1B where 1B is the indicator function of B ∈ B(X).
Then ∫
X
f(x)Φs(dx) =
∫
X
1BΦs(dx)
=
∫
X
Qg(x, s, B)s(dx)
=
∫
X
∑
j
pj1B(w(x, g(x, s), s, ζj)s(dx)
=
∫
X
∑
j
pjf(w(x, g(x, s), s, ζj)s(dx).
A standard argument shows that (3) holds for every bounded and measurable function f .
Assume that sn converges weakly to s. Let f : X → R be a continuous and bounded
function. Since w is jointly continuous and g is continuous(see Lemma 2), we have
f(w(xn, g(xn, sn), sn, ζ))→ f(w(x, g(x, s), s, ζ)
whenever xn → x. Let kn(x) :=
∑n
j=1 pjf(w(x, g(x, sn), sn, ζj) and
k(x) :=
∑n
j=1 pjf(w(x, g(x, s), s, ζj). Then kn converges continuously to k, i.e., kn(xn)→
k(x) whenever xn → x. Since f is bounded, the sequence kn is uniformly bounded. Using
Proposition 1 and equality (3), we have
lim
n→∞
∫
X
f(x)Φsn(dx) = lim
n→∞
∫
X
kn(x)sn(dx)
=
∫
X
k(x)s(dx)
=
∫
X
f(x)Φs(dx) .
Thus, Φsn converges weakly to Φs. We conclude that Φ is continuous. Thus, by the
Schauder-Tychonoff’s fixed point theorem, Φ has a fixed point.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that f ∈ B(X × P(X)) is concave and increasing in
x. Since the composition of a concave and increasing function with a concave function
is a concave function, the function f(w(x, a, s, ζ), s) is concave in (x, a) for all s and
ζ . Since w and f are increasing in x then f(w(x, a, s, ζ), s) is increasing in x for all
a, s and ζ . Thus, h(x, a, s, f) is concave in (x, a) and increasing in x as the sum of
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concave and increasing functions. A standard argument shows that Tf is increasing in x.
Proposition 2.3.6 in Bertsekas et al. (2003) and the fact that Γ(x) is convex-valued imply
that Tf(x, s) = max
a∈Γ(x)
h(x, a, s, f) is concave in x.
We conclude that for all n = 1, 2, 3 . . ., T nf is concave and increasing in x. Standard
dynamic programming arguments (see Bertsekas and Shreve (1978)) show that T nf con-
verges to V uniformly. Since the set of concave and increasing functions is closed under
uniform convergence, V is concave and increasing in x.
Since π is strictly concave in a, h(x, a, s, V ) is strictly concave in a. This implies that
G(x, s) = argmaxa∈Γ(x) h(x, a, s, V ) is single-valued which proves the Lemma.
B.3 Comparative statics: Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 4. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the operator Ms :
P(X)× I → P(X) defined by
Ms(θ, e)(·) =
∫
X
Q(x, s, e, ·)θ(dx)
has a unique fixed point µs,e for each s ∈ P(X) and e ∈ I.
Fix s ∈ P(X). Let θ2 SD θ1 and e2 I e1 and let B be an upper set. We have
Ms(θ2, e2)(B) =
∫
X
Q(x, s, e2, B)θ2(dx)
≥
∫
X
Q(x, s, e2, B)θ1(dx)
≥
∫
X
Q(x, s, e1, B)θ1(dx) =Ms(θ1, e1)(B).
Thus, Ms(θ2, e2) SD Ms(θ1, e1). The first inequality holds because θ2 SD θ1 and Q is
increasing in x when B is an upper set. The second inequality follows from the fact that
Q is increasing in e when B is an upper set.
We conclude that Ms is an increasing function from P(X)× I into P(X) when P(X)
is endowed with SD. Thus, M
n
s (θ2, e2) SD M
n
s (θ1, e1) for all n ∈ N. Q being X-
ergodic implies that Mns (θi, ei) converges weakly to µs,ei. Since SD is closed under weak
convergence (see Kamae et al. (1977)), we have µs,e2 SD µs,e1.
Now assume that e2 I e1 and let s(e2), s(e1) be the corresponding MFEs. Assume
in contradiction that s(e2) ≺ s(e1). From the same argument as in Theorem 1 we can
conclude that µs(e2),e SD µs(e1),e for each e ∈ I. Note that s(e) is an MFE if and only if
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s(e) = µs(e),e. We have
s(e2) = µs(e2),e2 SD µs(e2),e1 SD µs(e1),e1 = s(e1).
Transitivity ofSD implies s(e2) SD s(e1). But sinceSD agrees with, s(e2) SD s(e1)
implies s(e2)  s(e1) which is a contradiction. We conclude that s(e2)  s(e1).
B.4 Dynamic Oligopoly Models: Proofs of Theorems 5, 6, 7,
and 8
Proof of Theorem 5. The idea of the proof is to show that the conditions of Theorem
1 and Theorem 3 hold. In Lemma 3 we prove that the optimal stationary investment
strategy is single-valued. In Lemma 4 we prove that Q is increasing in x and decreasing
in s. In Lemma 6 we prove that the state space can be chosen to be compact. That
is, there exists a compact set X¯ = [0, x¯] such that Q(x, s, X¯) = 1 whenever x ∈ X¯ and
all s ∈ P(X). This means that if a firm’s initial state is in X¯ , then the firm’s state
will remain in X¯ in the next period with probability 1. In Lemma 7 we prove that Q is
X¯-ergodic. Thus, all conditions from Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 hold and we conclude
that the model has a unique MFE.
We first introduce some notations.
Let B(X × P(X)) be the space of all bounded functions on X × P(X). For f ∈
B(X × P(X)) define
fx(x, s) :=
∂f(x, s)
∂x
.
For the rest of the paper we say that f ∈ B(X×P(X)) is differentiable if it is differentiable
in the first argument. Similarly, we write ux(x, s) to denote the derivative of u with respect
to x.
For the proof of the theorem, it will be convenient to change the decision variable in
the Bellman equation. Define
z = (1− δ)x+ k(a),
and note that we can write a = k−1(z − (1 − δ)x), which is well defined because k is
strictly increasing. The resulting Bellman operator is given by
Kf(x, s) = max
z∈Γ(x)
J(x, z, s, f),
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where Γ(x) = [(1− δ)x+ k(0), (1− δ)x+ k(a¯)] and
J(x, z, s, f) = π(x, z, s) + β
∑
j
pjf(zζj, s),
where π(x, z, s) = u(x, s)− dk−1(z − (1− δ)x).
Let µf (x, s) = argmaxz∈Γ(x) J(x, z, s, f) and µ(x, s) = argmaxz∈Γ(x) J(x, z, s, V ). Note
that µ(x, s) = (1− δ)x+ k(g(x, s)) where g is the optimal stationary investment strategy.
With this change of variables, we can use the envelope theorem (see Benveniste and Scheinkman
(1979)). Since u and k are continuously differentiable, then J(x, z, s, f) is continuously
differentiable in x. The envelope theorem implies that Kf is differentiable and
Kfx(x, s) =
∂π(x, µf (x, s), s)
∂x
= ux(x, s) + d(1− δ)(k
−1)′(µf(x, s)− (1− δ)x).
Lemma 3 µ(x, s) is single-valued, increasing in x and decreasing in s.
Proof. The main step of the proof is to show that if f ∈ B(X × P(X)) has decreasing
differences then Kf ∈ B(X × P(X)) has decreasing differences. This implies that the
value function V has decreasing differences. An application of a Theorem by Topkis
implies that µ(x, s) is increasing in x and decreasing in s. Single-valuedness of µ follows
from the concavity of the value function. We provide the details below.
Assume that f ∈ B(X × P(X)) is concave in x, differentiable, and has decreasing
differences. The function f(zζ, s) is concave and increasing in z for all s and ζ . Since k
is strictly concave and strictly increasing, k−1 is strictly convex and strictly increasing.
This implies that −k−1(z − (1 − δ)x) is concave in (x, z). Thus, J(x, z, s, f) is concave
in (x, z) as the sum of concave functions. Proposition 2.3.6 in Bertsekas et al. (2003) and
the fact that Γ(x) is convex-valued imply that Kf(x, s) is concave in x.
Since f has decreasing differences, then f(zζ, s) has decreasing differences in (z, s) for
all ζ . Thus, J has decreasing differences in (z, s) as the sum of functions with decreasing
differences. From Theorem 6.1 in Topkis (1978), µf(x, s) is decreasing in s for every x.
Let x2 ≥ x1, z2 ≥ z1, y
′ = z1− (1− δ)x2, y = z1− (1− δ)x1 and t = z2− z1. Note that
y ≥ y′. Convexity of k−1 implies that for y ≥ y′ and t ≥ 0, we have k−1(y+ t)− k−1(y) ≥
k−1(y′+ t)−k−1(y′). That is, k−1(z− (1− δ)x) has decreasing differences in (x, z). Thus,
π(x, z, s) = u(x, s)− k−1(z − (1− δ)x) has increasing differences in (x, z).
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Let s2  s1. For every x ∈ X we have
Kfx(x, s1) = πx(x, µf(x, s1), s1)
≥ πx(x, µf(x, s1), s2)
≥ πx(x, µf(x, s2), s2) = Kfx(x, s2). (4)
The first and last equality follow from the envelope theorem. The first inequality fol-
lows since π has decreasing differences in (x, s). The second inequality follows from the
facts that π has increasing differences in (x, z) and µf(x, s1) ≥ µf(x, s2). Thus, Kf has
decreasing differences.
Define fn = Knf := K(Kn−1f) for n = 1, 2, . . . where K0f := f . By iterating the
previous argument we conclude that fnx (x, s) is decreasing in s and f
n(x, s) is concave in
x for every n ∈ N.
Standard dynamic programming arguments (see Bertsekas and Shreve (1978)) show
that fn converges uniformly to V . Since the set of concave functions is closed under
uniform convergence, V is concave in x. The envelope theorem implies that fnx (x, s) =
πx(x, µfn(x, s), s) for every n ∈ N. Since J(x, z, s, fn) is strictly concave in z when fn is
concave, µfn is single-valued. Theorem 3.8 and Theorem 9.9 in Stokey and Lucas (1989)
show that µfn → µ. Thus, f
n
x (x, s) = πx(x, µfn(x, s), s) → πx(x, µ(x, s), s) = Vx(x, s).
Using (4), we conclude that Vx(x, s) is decreasing in s; hence, V has decreasing differences.
The same argument as above shows that J(x, z, s, V ) has decreasing differences in (z, s)
and increasing differences in (x, z). Since J(x, z, s, V ) is strictly concave in z, then µ is
single-valued. It is easy to see that Γ(x) is ascending in the sense of Topkis (1978) (i.e.,
for x2 ≥ x1 if z ∈ Γ(x2) and z
′ ∈ Γ(x1) then max{z, z
′} ∈ Γ(x2) and min{z, z
′) ∈ Γ(x1)).
Theorem 6.1 in Topkis (1978) implies that µ(x, s) is increasing in x and decreasing in s
which proves the Lemma.
Lemma 4 Q is increasing in x for each s ∈ S and decreasing in s for each x ∈ X.
Proof. For each s ∈ P(X), x2 ≥ x1 and any upper set B we have
Q(x2, s, B) = Pr(((1− δ)x2 + k(g(x2, s))ζ) ∈ B)
= Pr(µ(x2, s)ζ ∈ B)
≥ Pr(µ(x1, s)ζ ∈ B) = Q(x1, s, B),
where the inequality follows since µ is increasing in x. Thus, Q(x2, s, ·) SD Q(x1, s, ·).
46
Similarly since µ(x, s) is decreasing in s, Q is decreasing in s for each x ∈ X .
We prove the following useful auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 5 (i) µ(x, s) is strictly increasing in x.
(ii) For all s ∈ P(X), µ is Lipschitz-continuous in the first argument with a Lipschitz
constant 1. That is,
|µ(x2, s)− µ(x1, s)| ≤ |x2 − x1|,
for all x2, x1 and s ∈ P(X).
Proof. (i) Fix s ∈ P(X). Assume in contradiction that x2 > x1 and µ(x1, s) = µ(x2, s).
First note that µ(x1, s) = µ(x2, s) ≥ (1 − δ)x2 + k(0) > (1 − δ)x1 + k(0) := min Γ(x1).
Thus, min Γ(x1) < µ(x1, s) ≤ maxΓ(x1) < maxΓ(x2). We have
0 ≤ −d(k−1)′(µ(x1, s)− (1− δ)x1) + β
n∑
j=1
pjζjVx(µ(x1, s)ζj, s)
< −d(k−1)′(µ(x2, s)− (1− δ)x2) + β
n∑
j=1
pjζjVx(µ(x2, s)ζj, s),
which contradicts the optimality of µ(x2, s), since µ(x2, s) < maxΓ(x2). The first inequal-
ity follows from the first order condition (recall that min Γ(x1) < µ(x1, s)). The second
inequality follows from the fact that k−1 is strictly convex, which implies that (k−1)′ is
strictly increasing. Thus, µ is strictly increasing in x.
(ii) Fix s ∈ P(X). Let x2 > x1. If µ(x1, s) = maxΓ(x1) = (1− δ)x1 + k(a¯), then
µ(x2, s)− µ(x1, s) ≤ (1− δ)(x2 − x1) + k(a¯)− k(a¯) ≤ x2 − x1.
So we can assume that µ(x1, s) < maxΓ(x1). Assume in contradiction that µ(x2, s) −
µ(x1, s) > x2 − x1. Then µ(x2, s)− (1− δ)x2 > µ(x1, s)− (1− δ)x1. We have
0 ≥ −d(k−1)′(µ(x1, s)− (1− δ)x1) + β
n∑
j=1
pjζjVx(µ(x1, s)ζj, s)
> −d(k−1)′(µ(x2, s)− (1− δ)x2) + β
n∑
j=1
pjζjVx(µ(x2, s)ζj, s).
The first inequality follows from the first order condition. The second inequality follows
from the facts that (k−1) is strictly convex and V is concave (see the proof of Lemma
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3). The last inequality implies that µ(x2, s) = min Γ(x2) = (1 − δ)x2 + k(0). But
µ(x1, s) ≥ minΓ(x1) implies
µ(x2, s)− µ(x1, s) ≤ (1− δ)(x2 − x1) < x2 − x1,
which is a contradiction. We conclude that µ is Lipschitz-continuous in the first argument
with a Lipschitz constant 1.
Lemma 6 The state space can be chosen to be compact: There exists a compact set
X¯ = [0, x¯] such that Q(x, s, X¯) = 1 whenever x ∈ X¯ and all s ∈ P(X).
Proof. Fix s ∈ P(X). Since maxΓ(x) = (1− δ)x+ k(a¯), for all x > 0, we have
µ(x, s)ζn
x
≤ (1− δ)ζn +
k(a¯)ζn
x
.
The last inequality and the fact that (1 − δ)ζn < 1 imply that there exists x¯ (that does
not depend on s) such that µ(x, s)ζn < x for all x ≥ x¯.
Let X¯ = [0, x¯]. For all s ∈ P(X) and ζ ∈ E, if x ∈ X¯ we have
µ(x, s)ζ ≤ µ(x¯, s)ζn < x¯.
That is, µ(x, s)ζ ∈ X¯. Thus, Q(x, s, X¯) = Pr(µ(x, s)ζ ∈ X¯) = 1 whenever x ∈ X¯ .
Lemma 7 Q is X¯-ergodic.
Proof. Fix s ∈ P(X). Define the sequences xk+1 = µ(xk, s)ζn and yk+1 = µ(yk, s)ζ1
where x1 = 0 and y1 = x¯. Note that {xn}
∞
n=1 is strictly increasing, i.e., xk+1 > xk
for all k. To see this, first note that x2 = µ(x1, s)ζn ≥ k(0)ζn > 0 = x1. Now if
xk > xk−1, then µ being strictly increasing in x (see Lemma 5 part (i)) implies that
xk+1 = µ(xk, s)ζn > µ(xk−1, s)ζn = xk. Let Cs = min{x ∈ R+ : µ(x, s)ζn = x}. From the
facts that µ(0, s)ζn ≥ k(0)ζn > 0, µ(x¯, s)ζn < x¯ (see Lemma 6), and µ is continuous (see
Lemma 2), by Brouwer fixed point theorem Cs is well defined. Similarly, the sequence
{yn}
∞
n=1 is strictly decreasing and therefore converges to a limit C
∗
s .
We claim that Cs > C
∗
s . To see this, first note that Lemma 6 implies that the function
fs, defined by fs(x, ζ) = µ(x, s)ζ , is from X¯ × E into X¯ . Note that fs is increasing in
both arguments and that X¯ is a complete lattice. Thus, Corollary 2.5.2 in Topkis (2011)
implies that the greatest and least fixed points of fs are increasing in ζ . Lemma 5 part
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(ii) and ζ1 < 1 imply that fs(x, ζ1) = µ(x, s)ζ1 is a contraction mapping from X¯ to itself.
Thus, fs(x, ζ1) has a unique fixed point which equals the limit of the sequence {yn}
∞
n=1,
C∗s . Since the least fixed point of fs is increasing in ζ we conclude that Cs ≥ C
∗
s . Since µ
is increasing and positive we have Cs = µ(Cs, s)ζn > µ(Cs, s)ζ1 ≥ µ(C
∗
s , s)ζ1 = C
∗
s
Let x∗ = (Cs + C
∗
s )/2. Since xk ↑ Cs and yk ↓ C
∗
s , there exists a finite N1 such
that xk > x
∗ for all k ≥ N1, and similarly, there exists a finite N2 such that yk < x
∗
for all k ≥ N2. Let m = max{N1, N2}. Thus, after m periods there exists a positive
probability (ζm1 ) to move from the state x¯ to the set [0, x
∗], and a positive probability to
move from the state 0 to the set [x∗, x¯]. That is, we found x∗ ∈ [0, x¯] and m > 0 such that
Qm(x¯, s, [0, x∗]) > 0 and Qm(0, s, [x∗, x¯]) > 0. Since X¯ is compact and Q is increasing in
x, then Q is X¯-ergodic (see Theorem 2 in Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992) or Theorem
2.1 in Bhattacharya and Lee (1988)).
Now, we prove Theorem 6. The main idea behind the proof is to show that the
optimal stationary strategy g is increasing or decreasing in the relevant parameter using a
lattice-theoretical approach and then to conclude that the conditions of Theorem 4 hold.
Let (I,I) be a partial order set that influences the firms’ decisions. We denote a
generic element in I by e. For instance, e can be the discount factor or the cost of a unit
of investment. Throughout the proof of Theorem 6 we allow an additional argument in
the functions that we consider. For instance, the value function V is denoted by:
V (x, s, e) = max
a∈[0,a¯]
h(x, a, s, e, V ).
Likewise, the optimal stationary strategy is denoted by g(x, s, e), and u(x, s, e) is the
one-period profit function. Here, we come back to the original formulation over actions a.
Proof of Theorem 6. i) Assume that f ∈ B(X × P(X) × I) is concave in the first
argument and has decreasing differences in (x, d) where I ⊆ R+ is the set of all possible
unit investment costs endowed with the natural order, d2 ≥ d1.
Fix s ∈ P(X). Note that da has increasing differences in (a, d). Thus, u(x, s)−da has
decreasing differences in (a, d), (x, a) and (x, d). Since f has decreasing differences and
k is increasing, the function f(((1− δ)x+ k(a))ζ, s, d) has decreasing differences in (a, d)
and (x, d) for every ζ ∈ E. Since f is concave in the first argument and k is increasing,
it can be shown that the function f(((1− δ)x+ k(a))ζ, s, d) has decreasing differences in
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(x, a) for every ζ ∈ E. Thus, the function
h(x, a, s, d, f) = u(x, s)− da+ β
n∑
j=1
pjf(((1− δ)x+ k(a))ζj , s, d)
has decreasing differences in (x, a), (x, d) and (a, d) as the sum of functions with decreasing
differences.
A similar argument to Lemma 1 in Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992) or Lemma 2 in
Lovejoy (1987) implies that if h(x, a, s, d, f) has decreasing differences in (x, a), (x, d) and
(a, d), then Tf(x, s, d) = max
a∈[0,a¯]
h(x, a, s, d, f) has decreasing differences in (x, d). The proof
of Lemma 3 implies that Tf is concave in x. We conclude that for all n = 1, 2, 3..., T nf is
concave in x and has decreasing differences. Standard dynamic programming arguments
(see Bertsekas and Shreve (1978)) show that T nf converges to V uniformly. Since the
set of functions with decreasing differences is closed under uniform convergence, V has
decreasing differences in (x, d). From the same argument as above, h(x, a, s, d, V ) has
decreasing differences in (a, d). Theorem 6.1 in Topkis (1978) implies that g(x, s, d) is
decreasing in d.
Define the order I by d2 I d1 if and only if d1 ≥ d2. Thus d2 I d1 implies that
Q(x, s, d2, B) = Pr(((1− δ)x+ k(g(x, s, d2))ζ ∈ B)
≥ Pr(((1− δ)x+ k(g(x, s, d1))ζ ∈ B)
= Q(x, s, d1, B)
for all x, s and every upper set B, because g(x, s, d) is decreasing in d. That is, Q(x, s, d2, ·) SD
Q(x, s, d1, ·) for all x, s and d2, d1 ∈ I such that d2 I d1. From Theorem 4 and Theorem
5 we conclude that d2 I d1 implies s(d2)  s(d1), i.e., d2 ≤ d1 implies s(d2)  s(d1).
(ii) The proof of part (ii) is the same as the proof of part (i) and is therefore omitted.
(iii) Assume that f ∈ B(X × P(X) × I) is increasing in the first argument and has
decreasing differences in (x, β) where I = (0, 1) is the set of all possible discount factors
endowed with the reverse order; β2 I β1 if and only if β1 ≥ β2. A standard argument
shows that Tf is increasing in the first argument. We will only show that h(x, a, s, β, f)
has decreasing differences in (a, β) and (x, β); the rest of the proof is the same as the
proof of part (i). Fix s, x and let β2 I β1 (i.e., β1 ≥ β2), and a2 ≥ a1. Decreasing
differences of f and the fact that k is increasing imply that f(((1− δ)x+ k(a2))ζ, s, β)−
f(((1 − δ) + k(a1))ζ, s, β) is decreasing in β for all ζ ∈ E. Since β1 ≥ β2, f and k are
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increasing, we have
β2
n∑
j=1
pj(f(((1− δ)x+ k(a2))ζj, s, β2)− f(((1− δ)x+ k(a1))ζj, s, β2))
≤ β1
n∑
j=1
pj(f(((1− δ)x+ k(a2))ζj, s, β1)− f(((1− δ)x+ k(a1))ζj, s, β1)).
Thus h(x, a, s, β, f) has decreasing differences in (a, β). A similar argument shows that
h(x, a, s, β, f) has decreasing differences in (x, β).
Proof of Theorem 7. (i) The proof of the Theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem
5. The idea of the proof is to show that the conditions of Theorem 9 hold. We now show
that Q is increasing in x and decreasing in s (see Section A.1 for the definition of Q).
We use the same change of variables and notation as in the proof of Theorem 5. Define
z = (1− δ)(x+ a) (5)
and note that a = (1− δ)−1z − x. The resulting Bellman operator is given by
Kf(x, s) = max
z∈Γ(x)
J(x, z, s, f),
where Γ(x) = [(1− δ)(x+ 1), (1− δ)(x+ a)],
J(x, z, s, f) = π(x, z, s) + β
∑
j
pjf (zζj , s) ,
and
π(x, z, s) = r
(x+ (1− δ)−1z − x)γ1(∫
(x′ + (1− δ)−1z′ − x′)s(dx′, dz′)
)γ2 − (1− δ)−1z − x
= r
((1− δ)−1z)
γ1(∫
(1− δ)−1z′s(dx′, dz′)
)γ2 − x− (1− δ)−1z.
Let µ(x, s) = argmaxz∈Γ(x) J(x, z, s, V ). Since π is concave in (x, z), Lemma 3 implies
that the policy function µ(x, s) is single-valued.
It is immediate that π has increasing differences in (x, z), and decreasing differences
51
in (z, s) and (x, s). Here s2  s1 if and only if∫
(1− δ)−1z′s2(dx
′, dz′) ≥
∫
(1− δ)−1z′s1(dx
′, dz′).
From Lemma 3, we can show that µ is increasing in x and decreasing in s.
Thus, for each s ∈ P(X ×A), x2 ≥ x1 and any upper set B ×D ∈ B(X ×A) we have
Q(x2, s, B ×D) =
n∑
j=1
pj1B×D(µ(x2, s)ζj, µ (µ(x2, s)ζj, s))
≥
n∑
j=1
pj1B×D(µ(x1, s)ζj, µ(µ(x1, s)ζj, s))
= Q(x1, s, B ×D).
The equalities follow from the proof of Theorem 9. The inequality follows because µ is
increasing in x. Thus, Q(x2, s, ·) SD Q(x1, s, ·), i.e., Q is increasing in x.
Similarly, because µ(x, s) is decreasing in s, we can show that Q is decreasing in s for
each x ∈ X .
We conclude that Q is decreasing in s and increasing in x. Compactness of the
state space X and X-ergodicity of Q can be established using similar arguments to the
arguments in Theorem 5. Thus, all the conditions of Theorem 9 parts (i) and (ii) hold.
We conclude that the dynamic advertising model has a unique MFE.
The proofs of parts (ii) and (iii) are similar to the proof of Theorem 6 and are therefore
omitted.
Proof of Theorem 8. (i) First note that the state space X = [0,M1] × [0,M2] is
compact. We now show that Q is increasing in x1 and decreasing in s.
For the proof of the theorem, it will be convenient to change the decision variable in
the Bellman equation. Define
z =
x2
1 + x2
x1 +
1
1 + x2
k(a),
and note that we can write a = k−1(z(1 + x2)− x2x1), which is well defined because k is
strictly increasing. The resulting Bellman operator is given by
Kf(x1, x2, s) = max
z∈Γ(x1,x2)
J(x1, x2, z, s, f),
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where Γ(x1, x2) = [
x2
1+x2
x1 +
1
1+x2
k(0), x2
1+x2
x1 +
1
1+x2
k(a¯)],
J(x1, x2, z, s, f) = π(x1, x2, z, s) + β
∑
j
pjf (min(zζj ,M1),min(x2 + 1,M2), s) ,
and
π(x1, x2, z, s) =
ν(x1, x2)∫
ν(x1, x2)s(d(x1, x2))
− dk−1(z(1 + x2)− x2x1).
Let µ(x1, x2, s) = argmaxz∈Γ(x1,x2) J(x1, x2, z, s, V ). From Lemma 3, the optimal station-
ary strategy µ(x1, x2, s) is single-valued.
Let x′1 ≤ x1 and s2  s1. Since w is increasing, we have
ν(x1, x2)
(
1∫
ν(x1, x2)s2(d(x1, x2))
−
1∫
ν(x1, x2)s1(d(x1, x2))
)
≤ ν(x′1, x2)
(
1∫
ν(x1, x2)s2(d(x1, x2))
−
1∫
ν(x1, x2)s1(d(x1, x2))
)
.
Thus, π has decreasing differences in (x1, s). In addition, π has decreasing differences in
(z, s) and increasing differences in (x1, z) (see the proof of Lemma 3). From Lemma 3,
we can show that µ is increasing in x1 and decreasing in s.
Recall that in every period, with probability 1−β, each seller departs the market and
a new seller with state (0, 0) immediately arrives to the market. With probability β, each
seller stays in the market and moves to a new state according to the dynamics described
in Section 4.3. Thus, we have
Q(x1, x2, s, B1 × B2) = (1− β)δ{(0,0)}(B1 × B2)
+ β Pr ((min(µ(x1, x2, s)ζ,M1),min(x2 + 1,M2)) ∈ B1 × B2)
= (1− β)1B1×B2(0, 0)
+ β
n∑
j=1
pj1B1×B2(min(µ(x1, x2, s)ζj,M1),min(x2 + 1,M2))
where δ{c} is the Dirac measure on the point c ∈ R2. Let f : X1 ×X2 → R be increasing
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in the first argument. Assume that x′1 ≤ x1. We have∫
X
f(y1, y2)Q((x
′
1, x2), s, d(y1, y2)) = (1− β)f(0, 0) + β
n∑
j=1
pjf(min(µ(x
′
1, x2, s)ζj,M1),min(x2 + 1,M2))
≤ (1− β)f(0, 0) + β
n∑
j=1
pjf(min(µ(x1, x2, s)ζj,M1),min(x2 + 1,M2))
=
∫
X
f(y1, y2)Q((x1, x2), s, d(y1, y2)).
The inequality follows from the facts that µ is increasing in x1, and f is increasing in the
first argument.
We conclude that Q is increasing in x1. Similarly, because µ is decreasing in s, we can
prove that Q is decreasing in s. We now show that Q is X-ergodic.
The Markov chain Q is said to satisfy the Doeblin condition if there exists a positive
integer n0, ǫ > 0 and a probability measure υ on X such that Q
n0(x, s, B) ≥ ǫυ(B)
for all x ∈ X and all measurable B. From the definition of Q, we have Q(x, s, B) ≥
(1 − β)δ{(0,0)}(B) for every measurable B, so Q satisfies the Doeblin condition. Thus, Q
is X-ergodic (see Theorem 8 in Roberts and Rosenthal (2004)).
Thus, all the conditions of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 are satisfied. We conclude that
the dynamic reputation model has a unique MFE.
(ii) The proof of part (ii) is similar to the proof of Theorem 6 and is therefore omitted.
B.5 Heterogeneous Agent Macro Models: Proof of Corollary 3
Proof of Corollary 3. From Theorem 2 we only need to show that Q is increasing in
x1 and decreasing in s in order to prove Corollary 3.
Let f : X1 ×X2 → R be increasing in the first argument. Assume that x′1 ≤ x1. We
have ∫
X
f(y1, y2)Q((x
′
1, x2), s, d(y1, y2)) =
∑
j
pjf(g˜(x
′
1, x2, H(s)), m(x2, ζj))
≤
∑
j
pjf(g˜(x1, x2, H(s)), m(x2, ζj))
=
∫
X
f(y1, y2)Q((x1, x2), s, d(y1, y2)).
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The inequality follows from the facts that g˜ is increasing in x1 and f is increasing in the
first argument. In a similar manner, because g˜ is decreasing in the aggregator, we can
show that Q is decreasing in s.
We conclude that Q is increasing in x1 and decreasing in s.
B.6 Extensions: Proof of Theorem 9
Proof of Theorem 9. The proofs of part (i) and of part (iii) are the same as the proofs
of Theorem 1 and of Theorem 4. To prove part (ii) we need to show that the operator
Φ : P(X)→ P(X) defined by
Φs(B ×D) =
∫
X
Q(x, s, B ×D)s(dx, A).
is continuous (the rest of the proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 3). The continuity
of Φ follows from a similar argument to the argument in the proof of Theorem 3. We
provide the proof for completeness.
Note that for every bounded and measurable function f : X × A → R and for every
s ∈ P(X × A) we have
∫
X×A
f (x, a) Φs (d (x, a)) =
∫
X
n∑
j=1
pjf (w (x, g(x, s), s, ζj) , g (w (x, g(x, s), s, ζj) , s)) s (dx, A) .
(6)
To see this, first assume that f = 1B×D for some measurable set B ×D ∈ B(X ×A). We
have∫
X×A
f (x, a) Φs (d(x, a)) = Φs (B ×D)
=
∫
X
∫
B
1D(g (y, s))Q (x, s, dy) s(dx, A)
=
∫
X
∫
X
1B (y) 1D (g(y, s))Q(x, s, dy)s(dx, A)
=
∫
X
∫
X
1B×D (y, g(y, s))Q(x, s, dy)s(dx, A)
=
∫
X
n∑
j=1
pj1B×D (w (x, g (x, s) , s, ζj) , g (w (x, g (x, s) , s, ζj) , s)) s (dx, A)
=
∫
X
n∑
j=1
pjf (w (x, g (x, s) , s, ζj) , g (w (x, g (x, s) , s, ζj) , s)) s (dx, A) .
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A standard argument shows that Equation (6) holds for every bounded and measurable
function f .
Assume that sn converges weakly to s. Thus, the marginal distribution sn(·, A) con-
verges weakly to s(·, A). Let f : X × A → R be a continuous and bounded function.
Because w and g are continuous, we have
f(w(xn, g(xn, sn), sn, ζ), g(w (xn, g (xn, sn) , sn, ζ) , sn))→ f(w(x, g(x, s), s, ζ), g(w (x, g (x, s) , s, ζ) , s))
whenever xn → x.
Let kn (x) :=
∑n
j=1 pjf(w(x, g(x, sn), sn, ζj), g(w (x, g (x, sn) , sn, ζj) , sn)) and k (x) :=∑n
j=1 pjf(w(x, g(x, s), s, ζj), g(w (x, g (x, s) , s, ζj) , s)).
Then kn converges continuously to k, i.e., kn(xn) → k(x) whenever xn → x. Since f
is bounded, the sequence kn is uniformly bounded. Using Proposition 1 yields
lim
n→∞
∫
X×A
f(x, a)Φsn(d(x, a)) = lim
n→∞
∫
X
kn(x)sn(dx, A)
=
∫
X
k(x)s(dx, A)
=
∫
X×A
f(x, a)Φs(d(x, a))).
Thus, Φsn converges weakly to Φs. We conclude that Φ is continuous.
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